The matchmaking site IslamicMarriage.com helps Muslims around the world find partners through the Internet.

It is also becoming a recruiting tool for Islamic State terrorists.

New Zealander Mark Taylor appears to be a usual single man. He has a dating profile on IslamicMarriage.com. It says he works as a teacher and has a “good sense of humor.”

It also says he lives in Raqqa, Syria -- a center of the Islamic State group.

U.S. officials listed Taylor as an international terrorist earlier this year. He is one of several fighters in Syria and jihadist supporters in Europe and the U.S. with dating profiles on the site.

On IslamicMarriage.com, Taylor calls himself Abujohndaniel. He says he arrived in Raqqa 10 months ago.

The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) is a policy research organization based in Washington, D.C. The group says it first noticed jihadist activity on IslamicMarriage.com last May. Anat Agron is a researcher there. She believes that efforts by social media sites to block IS militants -- along with increased attention from Western intelligence agencies -- forced some jihadists to turn to dating sites.

“Previously Twitter and Facebook were more popular options for marrying off jihadists,” Agron told VOA. “I think that many realized these options were increasingly unsafe, and some folks probably got thrown in jail.

IslamicMarriage.com is owned by the World Singles group. Other World Singles sites include ArabWorld, IranianPersonals and EligibleGreeks.

Observers say that the jihadists’ use of the dating site may suggest it is becoming harder for IS members to find people to marry. The number of mainly young Western and North African women traveling to Syria to marry fighters appears to have gone down, they say.

It is not clear how many Western women have traveled to the area to become jihadi brides. Britain’s Institute of Strategic Dialogue estimates the number at about 500.

VOA's Jamie Dettmer reported this story from London. It was adapted for VOA Learning English. Caty Weaver was the editor.

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Words in This Story

matchmaking - n. the act of trying to bring two people together so that they will marry each other

recruit - v. ​to find suitable people and get them to join a company, an organization, the armed forces, etc.​

jihadi - n. a person involved in a jihad; an Islamic militant.

profile - n. ​(on a social media website or application) a user's summary of their personal details ​

date - v. ​to do an activity with someone you have or might have a romantic relationship with : to go on a date or several dates with (someone)​

option - n. ​the opportunity or ability to choose something or to choose between two or more things​

Islamic term

For other uses, see Jihad (disambiguation).

Jihad (; Arabic: جهاد, romanized: jihād[dʒiˈhaːd]) is an Arabic word which literally means "striving" or "struggling", especially with a praiseworthy aim.^[1][2][3][4] In an Islamic context, it can refer to almost any effort to make personal and social life conform with God's guidance, such as struggle against one's evil inclinations, proselytizing, or efforts toward the moral betterment of the Muslim community (Ummah),^[1][2][5][6] though it is most frequently associated with war.^[4][7] In classical Islamic law (sharia), the term refers to armed struggle against unbelievers,^[2][3] while modernist Islamic scholars generally equate military jihad with defensive warfare.^[8][9] In Sufi circles, spiritual and moral jihad has been traditionally emphasized under the name of greater jihad.^[5][10][3] The term has gained additional attention in recent decades through its use by various insurgentIslamic extremist, militantIslamist, and terrorist individuals and organizations whose ideology is based on the Islamic notion of jihad.^{[5][7][11][12]}

The word jihad appears frequently in the Qur'an with and without military connotations,^[13] often in the idiomatic expression "striving in the path of God (al-jihad fi sabil Allah)",^[14][15] conveying a sense of self-exertion. They developed an elaborate set of rules pertaining to jihad, including prohibitions on harming those who are not engaged in combat.^[17][18] In the modern era, the notion of jihad has lost its jurisprudential relevance and instead given rise to an ideological and political discourse.^[5][8] While modernist Islamic scholars have emphasized the defensive and non-military aspects of jihad, some Islamists have advanced aggressive interpretations that go beyond the classical theory.^[8][12]

Jihad is classified into inner ("greater") jihad, which involves a struggle against one's own base impulses, and external ("lesser") jihad, which is further subdivided into jihad of the pen/tongue (debate or persuasion) and jihad of the sword.^[5][10] Most Western writers consider external jihad to have primacy over inner jihad in the Islamic tradition, while much of contemporary Muslim opinion favors the opposite view.Gallup analysis of a large survey reveals considerable nuance in the conceptions of jihad held by Muslims around the world.^[20]

The sense of jihad as armed resistance was first used in the context of persecution faced by Muslims, as when Muhammad was at Mecca, when the community had two choices: emigration (hijra) or jihad. In TwelverShi'a Islam, jihad is one of the ten Practices of the Religion.^[22] A person engaged in jihad is called a mujahid (plural: mujahideen). The term jihad is often rendered in English as "Holy War",^[23][24][25] although this translation is controversial.^[26][27] Today, the word jihad is often used without religious connotations, like the English crusade.^[1][2]

Etymology and literary origins

The term jihad is derived from the Arabic rootjahada, meaning "to exert strength and effort, to use all means in order to accomplish a task". In its expanded sense, it can be fighting the enemies of Islam, as well as adhering to religious teachings, enjoining good and forbidding evil.^[28] The peaceful sense of "efforts towards the moral uplift of society or towards the spread of Islam" can be known as "jihad of the tongue" or "jihad of the pen", as opposed to "jihad of the sword".^[29] It is used as a term in fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) mostly in the latter sense, while in Sufism mostly in the sense of fighting the nafs al-ammara, which is the psychological state of being consumed by your own desires.^[28] Spiritual and moral jihad is generally emphasized in pious and mystical circles.^[29]

The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic defines the term as "fight, battle; jihad, holy war (against the infidels, as a religious duty)".^[30] However, given the range of meanings, it is incorrect to equate it simply with "holy war".^[29] The notion of jihad has its origins in the Islamic idea that the whole humankind will embrace Islam.^[31] In the Qur'an and in later Muslim usage, jihad is commonly followed by the expression fi sabil illah, "in the path of God."^[32]Muhammad Abdel-Haleem states that it indicates "the way of truth and justice, including all the teachings it gives on the justifications and the conditions for the conduct of war and peace."^[33]

In Modern Standard Arabic, the term jihad is used for a struggle for causes, both religious and secular. It is sometimes used without religious connotation, with a meaning similar to the English word "crusade" (as in "a crusade against drugs").^[34]Jihad is also used quite commonly in Arabic countries, in the neutral sense of "a struggle for a noble cause", as a unisex name given to children.^[35] Nonetheless, jihad is usually used in the religious sense and its beginnings are traced back to the Qur'an and the words and actions of Muhammad.^[36][37]

Quran

Jihad is mentioned in four places in the Qur'an as a noun, while its derived verb is used in twenty-four places. Mujahid, the active participle meaning "jihadist", is mentioned in two verses.^[28] In some of these mentions (see At-Tawbah 9/41, 44, 81, 86), it is understood that the word jihad directly refers to war, and in others, jihad is used in the sense of "the effort to live in accordance with Allah's will".^[28] Quranic exhortions to jihad have been interpreted by Islamic scholars both in the combative and non-combative sense.^[38] Ahmed al-Dawoody writes that there seventeen references to or derivatices of jihad occur altogether forty-one times in eleven Meccan texts and thirty Medinan ones, with 28 mentions related to religious belief or spiritual struggle and 13 mentions related to warfare or physical struggle.^[13]

Hadith

There are also many hadiths (records of the teachings, deeds and sayings of the Islamic prophet Muhammad) about jihad, typically under the headings of kitab al-jihad (book of jihad) or faza'il al-jihad (virtues of jihad) in hadith collections or as the subject of independent works.^[28] Of the 199 hadith references to jihad in the Bukhari collection of hadith, all assume that jihad means warfare.^[39][40][41]

Among reported sayings of the Islamic prophet Muhammad involving jihad are

The best Jihad is the word of Justice in front of the oppressive sultan.

— cited by Ibn Nuhaas and narrated by Ibn Habbaan^[42][43][44]

and

The Messenger of Allah was asked about the best jihad. He said: "The best jihad is the one in which your horse is slain and your blood is spilled."

— cited by Ibn Nuhaas and narrated by Ibn Habbaan^[45]

Ibn Nuhaas also cited a hadith^{[citation needed]} from Musnad Ahmad ibn Hanbal, where Muhammad states that the highest kind of jihad is "The person who is killed whilst spilling the last of his blood" (Ahmed 4/144).^[46]

According to another hadith,^[47] supporting one's parents is also an example of jihad.^[48] It has also been reported that Muhammad considered performing hajj well to be the best jihad for Muslim women.^[49]

The hadith emphasize jihad as one of the means to Paradise. All sins (except debt) would be forgiven for the one dies in it. Participation in jihad had to be voluntary and intention must be pure, for jihad is only waged for the sake of God not for material wealth. On the contrary, jihad required man to put both his life and wealth at risk. Jihad is ranked as one of the highest good deeds; according to one hadith it is the third best deed after prayer and being good to one's parents. One hadith exempts military jihad on men whose parents are alive, as serving one's parents is considered a superior jihad.

Greater and Lesser jihad

Jihad has traditionally been divided into "greater jihad" (inner struggle against sinful behavior) and "lesser jihad" (military sense).^[5] Early Islamic thought considered non-violent interpretations of jihad, especially for those Muslims who could not partake in warfare in distant lands.^[53] Most classical writings use the term jihad in the military sense.^[54][55] The tradition differentiating between the “greater and lesser jihad” is not included in any of the authoritative compilations of Hadith. In consequence, some Islamists dismiss it as not authentic.^[56]

The most commonly cited hadith for "greater jihad" is:^[57]

A number of fighters came to Muhammad and he said "You have come from the 'lesser jihad' to the 'greater jihad'." The fighters asked "what is the greater jihad?" Muhammad replied replied, "It is the struggle against one's passions."^[58]

This was also cited in The History of Baghdad by Al-Khatib al-Baghdadi, an 11th-century Islamic scholar.^[59][60] This reference gave rise to the distinguishing of two forms of jihad: "greater" and "lesser".^[58] Some Islamic scholars, such as Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani, consider the hadith to have a weak chain of transmission.^[61]

The concept has had "enormous influence" in Islamic mysticism (Sufism).

Ibn Hazm, lists four kinds of jihad fi sabilillah (struggle in the cause of God):

• Jihad of the heart (jihad bil qalb/nafs) is concerned with combatting the devil and in the attempt to escape his persuasion to evil. This type of Jihad was regarded as the greater jihad (al-jihad al-akbar).
• Jihad by the tongue (jihad bil lisan) (also Jihad by the word, jihad al-qalam) is concerned with speaking the truth and spreading the word of Islam with one's tongue.
• Jihad by the hand (jihad bil yad) refers to choosing to do what is right and to combat injustice and what is wrong with action.
• Jihad by the sword (jihad bis saif) refers to qital fi sabilillah (armed fighting in the way of God, or holy war), the most common usage by Salafi Muslims and offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood.^[64]

A related hadith tradition that has "found its way into popular Muslim literature",^[65] and which has been said to "embody the Muslim mindset" of the Islamic Golden Age (the period from the mid-8th century to mid-13th century following the relocation of the Abbasid capital from Damascus to Baghdad),^[66] is:

"The ink of the scholar is more holy than the blood of the martyr."

The belief in the veracity of this hadith was a contributing factor in the efforts by successive caliphs to subsidize translations of "Greek, Hebrew and Syriac science and philosophy texts",^[67] and the saying continues to be heavily emphasised to this day in certain Islamic traditions advocating intellectualism over violence, for example in Timbuktu,^[68] where it is central to one of two key lessons in the work Tuhfat al-fudala by the 16th-century Berber scholar Ahmed Baba.^[69] In general, however, fewer people today are aware of the hadith, which suffers from "a general lack of knowledge", according to Akbar Ahmed.^[70]

According to classical Islamic scholars like Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Jihad is against four types of enemies: the lower self (nafs), Satan, the unbelievers, and the hypocrites. The first two types of Jihad are purely peaceful spiritual struggles. According to Ibn Qayyim "Jihad against the lower self precedes jihad against external enemies". Confirming the central importance of the spiritual aspect of Jihad, Ibn Taymiyyah writes:

"Jihad against the lower self and whims is the foundation of jihad against the unbelievers and hypocrites, for a Muslim cannot wage jihad against them unless he has waged jihad against himself and his desires first, before he goes out against them."^[71]

Engaging in the greater jihad did not preclude engaging in the lesser jihad. Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani recommended his followers to pursue both the greater and the lesser jihads.^[72]

At least one important contemporary Twelver Shia figure, AyatollahRuhollah Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian Revolution and the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, wrote a treatise on the "Greater Jihad" (i.e., internal/personal struggle against sin).^[73]

Defensive and offensive jihad

Main article: Rules of war in Islam

Classical scholars discussed justifications for jihad, including waging it defensively vs offensively. However, classical jurists paid more attention to conduct of war jus in bello (see next section) than justification of war jus ad bellum.^[74] The decision of when to wage war was often viewed viewed as a political decision best left to political authorities.

Two justifications for jihad were given: defensive war against external aggression, or an offensive or preemptive attack against an enemy state. According to the majority of jurists, the casus belli (justifications for war) are restricted to aggression against Muslims, and fitna—persecution of Muslims because of their religious belief. They hold that unbelief in itself is not a justification for war. These jurists therefore maintain that only combatants are to be fought; noncombatants such as women, children, clergy, the aged, the insane, farmers, serfs, the blind, and so on are not to be killed in war. Thus, the Hanafī Ibn Najīm states: "the reason for jihād in our [the Hanafīs] view is kawnuhum harbā ‛alaynā [literally, their being at war against us]."^[80] The Hanafī jurists al-Shaybānī state that "although kufr [unbelief in God] is one of the greatest sins, it is between the individual and his God the Almighty and the punishment for this sin is to be postponed to the dār al-jazā’, (the abode of reckoning, the Hereafter)," and al-Sarakhsī says something similar. Offensive jihad involved forays into enemy territory either for conquest, and thus enlarging the Muslim political order, or to dissuade the enemy from attacking Muslim lands.^[82]

Shia and Sunni theories of jihad are similar,^[36] except that Shias consider offensive jihad to be valid only under the leadership of the Mahdi, who is currently believed to be in occultation but will return at some point in the future.^[83][84] However, defensive jihad is permissible in Shia Islam before the Mahdi's return.^[83] In fact, Shia scholars emphasized it was a religious duty for Shia to defend all Muslims (including Sunni Muslims) from outside invaders.

They might be our enemies but they are human beings. They consist of civil population comprising of women and children; how can one kill, loot and plunder them?

— Ali ibn Abi Talib, Najh Al-Balagha

Rules of warfare

Rules prohibit attacking or molesting non-combatants, which include women, children under the age of Puberty, elderly men, people with disabilities and those who are sick. Diplomats, merchants and peasants are similarly immune from being attacked. Monks are presumed to be non-combatants and thus have immunity too; similarly places of worship should not be attacked. Even if the enemy disregarded the immunity of noncombatants, Muslims could not respond in kind.^[72] However, these categories lose their immunity if they participate in fighting, planning or supplying the enemy. Some jurists argued that immunity was more related to noncombatant status than being in a certain demographic class. For example, Muhaqqiq al-Hilli opined that only old men are only immune from being killed if they neither fight, nor take a role in military decision making.

Up until the Crusades, Muslim jurists disallowed the use of mangonels because the weapon killed indiscriminately with the potential of harming noncombatants. But during Crusades this ruling was reversed out of military need. Jurists also grappled with the question of attacking an enemy that used women, children or Muslims as human shields. Most jurists held that it was permissible to attack the enemy in cases of military necessity, but steps should be taken to direct at the attack towards the combatants and avoiding the human shield. Abu Hanifa argued that if Muslims stopped combat for fear of killing noncombatants, then such a rule would make fighting impossible, as every city had civilians.^[72] Mutilating the dead bodies of the enemy is prohibited.

There are two conflicting rulings on destruction of enemy property. In one military battle, Prophet Muhammad ordered the destruction of an enemy's palm trees as a means of ending a siege without bloodshed. By contrast, Abu Bakr prohibited destruction of trees, buildings and livestock. Most jurists did not allow unnecessary destruction of enemy property,^[72] but allowed it in cases of military necessity, such as destroying buildings in which the enemy is taking shelter. Some jurists also allowed destruction if it would weaken the enemy or win the war. Many jurists cautioned against "unnecessary devastation", not just out of humanitarian concerns, but practical ones: it is more useful to capture an enemy's property than to destroy it. Islamic scholars prohibited killing animals, unless due to military necessity (such as killing horses in battle). This is because, unlike other enemy property, animals are capable of feeling pain.

History of usage and practice

See also: List of expeditions of Muhammad

In pre-Islamic Arabia, Bedouins conducted raids against enemy tribes and settlements to collect spoils. According to some scholars (such as James Turner Johnson), while Islamic leaders "instilled into the hearts of the warriors the belief" in jihad "holy war" and ghaza (raids), the "fundamental structure" of this bedouin warfare "remained, ... raiding to collect booty".^[96] According to Jonathan Berkey, the Quran's statements in support of jihad may have originally been directed against Muhammad's local enemies, the pagans of Mecca or the Jews of Medina, but these same statements could be redirected once new enemies appeared.^[97] According to another scholar (Majid Khadduri), it was the shift in focus to the conquest and spoils collecting of non-Bedouin unbelievers and away from traditional inter-bedouin tribal raids, that may have made it possible for Islam not only to expand but to avoid self-destruction.^[98]

Classical

The primary aim of jihad as warfare is not the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam by force, but rather the expansion and defense of the Islamic state.^[99][100] In theory, jihad was to continue until "all mankind either embraced Islam or submitted to the authority of the Muslim state." There could be truces before this was achieved, but no permanent peace.^[101] One who died "on the path of God" was a martyr (shahid), whose sins were remitted and who was secured "immediate entry to paradise".^[84]

According with Bernard Lewis, "from an early date Muslim law laid down" jihad in the military sense as "one of the principal obligations" of both "the head of the Muslim state", who declared the jihad, and the Muslim community.^[101] According to legal historian Sadakat Kadri, Islamic jurists first developed classical doctrine of jihad "towards the end of the eighth century", using the doctrine of naskh (that God gradually improved His revelations over the course of Muhammed's mission) they subordinated verses in the Quran emphasizing harmony to more the more "confrontational" verses of Muhammad's later years and linked verses on exertion (jihad) to those of fighting (qital). Muslims jurists of the eighth century developed a paradigm of international relations that divides the world into three conceptual divisions, dar al-Islam/dar al-‛adl/dar al-salam (house of Islam/house of justice/house of peace), dar al-harb/dar al-jawr (house of war/house of injustice, oppression), and dar al-sulh/dar al-‛ahd/dār al-muwada‛ah (house of peace/house of covenant/house of reconciliation).^[103][104] The second/eighth century jurist Sufyan al-Thawri (d. 161/778) headed what Khadduri calls a pacifist school, which maintained that jihad was only a defensive war.^[105][106] He also states that the jurists who held this position, among whom he refers to Hanafi jurists al-Awza‛i (d. 157/774) and Malik ibn Anas (d. 179/795), and other early jurists, "stressed that tolerance should be shown unbelievers, especially scripturaries and advised the Imam to prosecute war only when the inhabitants of the dar al-harb came into conflict with Islam."^[106][107] The duty of Jihad was a collective one (fard al-kifaya). It was to be directed only by the caliph who might delayed it when convenient, negotiating truces for up to ten years at a time. Within classical Islamic jurisprudence—the development of which is to be dated into—the first few centuries after the prophet's death^[109]—jihad consisted of wars against unbelievers, apostates, and was the only form of warfare permissible.^[110] (Another source—Bernard Lewis—states that fighting rebels and bandits was legitimate though not a form of jihad,^[111] and that while the classical perception and presentation of the jihad was warfare in the field against a foreign enemy, internal jihad "against an infidel renegade, or otherwise illegitimate regime was not unknown."^[112])

However, some argue martyrdom is never automatic because it is within God's exclusive province to judge who is worthy of that designation.^[113]

Classical manuals of Islamic jurisprudence often contained a section called Book of Jihad, with rules governing the conduct of war covered at great length. Such rules include treatment of nonbelligerents, women, children (also cultivated or residential areas),^[114] and division of spoils. Such rules offered protection for civilians.^[117] Spoils include Ghanimah (spoils obtained by actual fighting), and fai (obtained without fighting i.e. when the enemy surrenders or flees).^[118]

The first documentation of the law of jihad was written by 'Abd al-Rahman al-Awza'i and Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani. (It grew out of debates that surfaced following Muhammad's death.^[36]) Although some Islamic scholars have differed on the implementation of Jihad, there is consensus amongst them that the concept of jihad will always include armed struggle against persecution and oppression.^[119]

Both Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim asserted that Muhammad never initiated any hostilities and that all the wars he engaged in were primarily defensive. He never forced non-Muslims to Islam and upheld the truces with non-Muslims so long as they didn't violate them. Ibn Taymiyya's views on Jihad are explained in his treatise titled Qāʿidah mukhtaṣarah fī qitāl al-kuffār wa muhādanatuhum wa taḥrīm qatlahum li mujarrad kufrihim. (An abridged rule on fighting the unbelievers and making truces with them, and the prohibition of killing them merely because of their unbelief) According to Ibn Taymiyya, every human blood is inviolable by default, except "by right of justice". Although Ibn Taymiyya authorised offensive Jihad ( Jihad al-Talab) against enemies who threaten Muslims or obstruct their citizens from freely accepting Islam, unbelief (Kufr) by itself is not a justification for violence, whether against individuals or states. According to Ibn Taymīyah, jihad is a legitimate reaction to military aggression by unbelievers and not merely due to religious differences. Ibn Taymiyya writes:

"As for the transgressor who does not fight, there are no texts in which Allah commands him to be fought. Rather, the unbelievers are only fought on the condition that they wage war, as is practiced by the majority of scholars and is evident in the Book and Sunnah."^[71][120]

As important as jihad was, it has not been considered one of the "pillars of Islam". According to one scholar (Majid Khadduri, this is because the five pillars are individual obligations, but jihad is a "collective obligation" of the whole Muslim community meant to be carried out by the Islamic state.^[121] This was the belief of "all jurists, with almost no exception", but did not apply to defense of the Muslim community from a sudden attack, in which case jihad was and "individual obligation" of all believers, including women and children.^[121]

Scholars had previously assumed it was the responsibility of a centralized government to organize jihad. But this changed as the authority of the Abbasid caliph weakened.^[122]Al-Mawardi allowed local governors to wage jihad on the caliph's behalf. This decentralization of jihad became especially pressing after the Crusades. Ali ibn Tahir al-Sulami argued that all Muslims were responsible for waging wars of self-defense.^[122] Al-Sulami encouraged Muslim rulers from distant lands to assist those Muslims being invaded.^[122]

Classical Shia doctrine maintained defensive jihad was always permissible, but offensive jihad required the presence of the Imam. An exception to this, during medieval times, was when the first Fatimid caliph Abdallah al-Mahdi Billah claimed to be the representative of the Imam and claimed the right to launch offensive jihad.

After the Mongol invasions, Shia scholar Muhaqqiq al-Hilli made defensive war not just permissible but praiseworthy, even obligatory. If a Muslim could not take part in the defense then he should, at least, send material support. This remained the case even if the Muslims were ruled by an unjust ruler.

Early Muslim conquests

Main article: Early Muslim conquests

In the early era that inspired classical Islam (Rashidun Caliphate) and lasted less than a century, jihad spread the realm of Islam to include millions of subjects, and an area extending "from the borders of India and China to the Pyrenees and the Atlantic".^[125] The role of religion in these early conquests is debated. Medieval Arabic authors believed the conquests were commanded by God, and presented them as orderly and disciplined, under the command of the caliph. Many modern historians question whether hunger and desertification, rather than jihad, was a motivating force in the conquests. The famous historian William Montgomery Watt argued that "Most of the participants in the [early Islamic] expeditions probably thought of nothing more than booty ... There was no thought of spreading the religion of Islam." Similarly, Edward J. Jurji argues that the motivations of the Arab conquests were certainly not "for the propagation of Islam ... Military advantage, economic desires, [and] the attempt to strengthen the hand of the state and enhance its sovereignty ... are some of the determining factors."^[48] Some recent explanations cite both material and religious causes in the conquests.

Post-Classical usage

According to some authors,^[who?] the more spiritual definitions of jihad developed sometime after the 150 years of jihad wars and Muslim territorial expansion, and particularly after the Mongol invaders sacked Baghdad and overthrew the Abbasid Caliphate.^{[citation needed][129]} The historian Hamilton Gibb states that "in the historic [Muslim] Community the concept of jihad had gradually weakened and at length it had been largely reinterpreted in terms of Sufi ethics."^[130] Johnson notes that "despite the theoretical importance of the idea of jihad in classical Islamic juristic thought", by the time of the Abbasids, the concept was no longer central to statecraft.^[96]

Rudolph Peters also wrote that with the stagnation of Islamic expansionism, the concept of jihad became internalized as a moral or spiritual struggle.^[131] Earlier classical works on fiqh emphasized jihad as war for God's religion, Peters found. Later Islamic scholars like Ibn al-Amir al-San'ani, Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Rida, Ubaidullah Sindhi, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Shibli Nomani, etc emphasized the defensive aspect of Jihad, distinguishing between defensive Jihad ( jihad al-daf) and offensive Jihad ( Jihad al-talab or Jihad of choice ). They refuted the notion of consensus on Jihad al-talab being a communal obligation( fard kifaya ). In support of this view, these scholars referred to the works of classical scholars such as Al-Jassas, Ibn Taymiyyah, etc. According to Ibn Taymiyya, the reason for Jihad against non-Muslims is not their disbelief, but the threat they pose to Muslims. Citing Ibn Taymiyya, scholars like Rashid Rida, Al San'ani, Qaradawi,etc argues that unbelievers need not be fought unless they pose a threat to Muslims. Thus, Jihad is obligatory only as a defensive warfare to respond to aggression or "perfidy" against the Muslim community, and that the "normal and desired state" between Islamic and non-Islamic territories was one of "peaceful coexistence." This was similar to the Western concept of a "Just war".^[132][133] Similarly the 18th-century Islamic scholar Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab defined Jihad as a defensive military action to protect the Muslim community, and emphasized its defensive aspect in synchrony with later 20th century Islamic writers.^[134] Today, some Muslim authors only recognize wars fought for the purpose of territorial defense as well as wars fought for the defense of religious freedom as legitimate.^[135]

Ibn Taymiyyah's hallmark themes included the permissibility of overthrowing a ruler who is classified as an unbeliever due to a failure to adhere to Islamic law, the absolute division of the world into dar al-kufr and dar al-Islam, the labeling of anyone not adhering to one's particular interpretation of Islam as an unbeliever, and the call for blanket warfare against Non-Muslims, particularly Jews and Christians.^[136]

Ibn Taymiyyah recognized "the possibility of a jihad against `heretical` and `deviant` Muslims within dar al-Islam. He identified as heretical and deviant Muslims anyone who propagated innovations (bida') contrary to the Quran and Sunna ... legitimated jihad against anyone who refused to abide by Islamic law or revolted against the true Muslim authorities." He used a very "broad definition" of what constituted aggression or rebellion against Muslims, which would make jihad "not only permissible but necessary."^[137] Ibn Taymiyyah also paid careful and lengthy attention to the questions of martyrdom and the benefits of jihad: 'It is in jihad that one can live and die in ultimate happiness, both in this world and in the Hereafter. Abandoning it means losing entirely or partially both kinds of happiness.`^[138]

Bernard Lewis states that while most Islamic theologians in the classical period (750–1258 CE) understood jihad to be a military endeavor,^[139] after Islamic conquest stagnated and the caliphate broke up into smaller states the "irresistible and permanent jihad came to an end". As jihad became unfeasible it was "postponed from historic to messianic time."^[140] Even when the Ottoman Empire carried on a new holy war of expansion in the seventeenth century, "the war was not universally pursued". They made no attempt to recover Spain or Sicily.^{[141][better source needed]}

By the 1500s, it had become accepted that the permanent state of relations between dar al-Islam and dar al-harb was that of peace.

Shah Ismail of the Safavid dynasty tried to claim the right to wage offensive jihad, particularly against the Ottomans. However, Shia ulama did not permit that, maintaining the classical position that the true Imam could wage such a war. During the Qajar period, Shia ulama adopted the position that the Shah was responsible for national security. They authorized the Perso-Russian wars in the 19th century as jihad.

In the 18th century, the Durrani Empire under the reigns of Ahmad Shah Durrani and his son and successor, Timur Shah Durrani had issued multiple jihads against Sikh Misls in the Punjab region, often to consolidate territory and continue Afghan rule in the region, efforts under Ahmad Shah failed, while Timur Shah had succeeded.^[144]

Colonialism and modernism

When Europeans began the colonization of the Muslim world, jihad was one of the first responses by local Muslims.Emir Abdelkader organized a jihad in Algeria against French domination, tapping into existing Sufi networks. Other wars against colonialist powers were often declared to be jihad: the Senussi religious order declared jihad against Italian control of Libya in 1912, and the "Mahdi" in the Sudan declared jihad against both the British and the Egyptians in 1881.^[84]

Rashid Rida and Muhammad Abduh argued that peaceful coexistence should be the normal state between Muslim and non-Muslim states, citing verses in the Qur'an that allowed war only in self-defense.^[2] However, this view still left open jihad against colonialism, which was seen as an attack on Muslims.^[2]

Sayyid Ahmad Khan also argued jihad was limited to cases of oppression, and since the British Raj allowed freedom of religion, there was no need to wage jihad against the British. Instead, Khan formulated jihad as recovering past Muslim scientific progress to modernize the Muslim world.

A concept that played a role in anti-colonial jihad (or lack thereof) was the belief in Mahdi. According to Islamic eschatology, a messianic figure named Mahdi will appear and restore justice on earth. Such a belief sometimes discouraged Muslims from conducting jihad against the colonial powers, instead inducing them to passively wait for the messiah to come. Such messages were circulated in Algeria to undermine Emir Abdelkader's jihad against the French. On the other hand, this belief could be a powerful mobilizing force in cases when someone would proclaim himself Mahdi. Such mahdist rebellions happened in India (1810), Egypt (1865) and Sudan (1881).

With the Islamic revival, a new "fundamentalist" movement arose, with some different interpretations of Islam, which often placed an increased emphasis on jihad. The Wahhabi movement which spread across the Arabian peninsula starting in the 18th century, emphasized jihad as armed struggle.^[149] The so-called Fulbe jihad states and a few other jihad states in West Africa were established by a series of offensive wars in the 19th century.^{[citation needed]} None of these jihad movements were victorious.^[150] The most powerful, the Sokoto Caliphate, lasted about a century until being incorporated into Colonial Nigeria in 1903.^{[citation needed]}

When the Ottoman caliph called for a "Great Jihad" by all Muslims against Allied powers during World War I, there were hopes and fears that non-Turkish Muslims would side with Ottoman Turkey, but the appeal did not "[unite] the Muslim world",^[140][151] and Muslims did not turn on their non-Muslim commanders in the Allied forces.^[152] (The war led to the end of the caliphate as the Ottoman Empire entered on the side of the war's losers and surrendered by agreeing to "viciously punitive" conditions. These were overturned by the popular war hero Mustafa Kemal, who was also a secularist and later abolished the caliphate.)

Prior to the Iranian revolution in 1922, the Shiite cleric Mehdi Al-Khalissi issued a fatwa calling upon Iraqis not to participate in the Iraqi elections, as the Iraqi government was established by foreign powers. He later played a role in the Iraqi revolt of 1920.^[154] Between 1918 and 1919 in the Shia holy city of Najaf the League of the Islamic Awakening was established by several religious scholars, tribal chiefs, and landlords assassinated a British officer in the hopes of sparking a similar rebellion in Karbala which is also regarded as sacred for Shias.^{[citation needed]}

During the Iraqi revolt of 1920, Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Shirazi the father of Mohammad al-Husayni al-Shirazi and grandfather of Sadiq Hussaini Shirazi, declared British rule impermissible and called for a jihad against European occupations in the Middle East.^[155]

Post-colonialism

Main articles: Islamism and Criticism of Islamism

Islamism has played an increasingly role in the Muslim world in the 20th century, especially following the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s.^[156] One of the first Islamist groups, the Muslim Brotherhood, emphasized physical struggle and martyrdom in its creed: "God is our objective; the Quran is our constitution; the Prophet is our leader; struggle (jihad) is our way; and death for the sake of God is the highest of our aspirations."^[157][158]Hassan al-Banna emphasized jihad of the sword, and called on Egyptians to prepare for jihad against the British Empire,^[159] (making him the first influential scholar since the 1857 India uprising to call for jihad of the sword). The group called for jihad against Israel in the 1940s,^[161] and its Palestinian branch, Hamas, called for jihad against Israel when the First Intifada started.^{[162][163][164]}

Modern Muslim thought had been focused on when to go to war (jus ad bellum), not paying much attention on conduct during war (jus in bello). This was because most Muslim theorists viewed international humanitarian law as consistent with Islamic requirements.^[165] However, recently Muslims have once again started discussing conduct during war in response to certain terrorist groups targeting civilians.^[165]

According to Rudolph F. Peters and Natana J. DeLong-Bas, the new "fundamentalist" movement brought a reinterpretation of Islam and their own writings on jihad. These writings tended to be less interested and involved with legal arguments, what the different of schools of Islamic law had to say, or in solutions for all potential situations. "They emphasize more the moral justifications and the underlying ethical values of the rules, than the detailed elaboration of those rules." They also tended to ignore the distinction between Greater and Lesser jihad because it distracted Muslims "from the development of the combative spirit they believe is required to rid the Islamic world of Western influences".^[166][167]

Contemporary Islamic fundamentalists were often influenced by medieval Islamic jurist Ibn Taymiyyah's, and Egyptian journalist Sayyid Qutb's, ideas on jihad.

Sayyid Qutb, Islamist author and influential leader of the Muslim Brotherhood

The highly influential Muslim Brotherhood leader, Sayyid Qutb, preached in his book Milestones that jihad, `is not a temporary phase but a permanent war ... Jihad for freedom cannot cease until the Satanic forces are put to an end and the religion is purified for God in toto.`^[168][169] Qutb focused on martyrdom and jihad, but he added the theme of the treachery and enmity towards Islam of Christians and especially Jews. If non-Muslims were waging a "war against Islam", jihad against them was not offensive but defensive. He also insisted that Christians and Jews were mushrikeen (not monotheists) because (he alleged) gave their priests or rabbis "authority to make laws, obeying laws which were made by them [and] not permitted by God" and "obedience to laws and judgments is a sort of worship".^[170][171]

Later ideologue, Muhammad abd-al-Salam Faraj, departed from some of Qutb's teachings on jihad. While Qutb felt that jihad was a proclamation of "liberation for humanity" (in which humanity has the free choice between Islam and unbelief), Faraj saw jihad as a mean of conquering the world and reestablishing the caliphate.^[172] Faraj legitimized lying, attacking by night (even if it leads to accidentally killing innocents), and destroying trees of the infidel.^[173][174] His ideas influenced Egyptian Islamist extremist groups,^[175] and Ayman al-Zawahiri, later the No. 2 person in al-Qaeda.^[176]

Many Muslims (including scholars like al-Qaradawi and Sayyid Tantawi) denounced Islamic terrorist attacks against civilians, seeing them as contrary to rules of jihad that prohibit targeting noncombatants.^[122]

During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, despite being a predominantly Sunni nation, Afghanistan's Shiite population took arms against the Communist government and allied Soviet forces like the nation's Sunnis and were collectively referred to as the Afghan Mujahideen. Shiite Jihadists in Afghanistan were known as the Tehran Eight and received support from the Iranian government in fighting against the Communist Afghan government and allied Soviet forces in Afghanistan.^[177][178]

Abdullah Azzam

Main article: Abdullah Azzam

In the 1980s Abdullah Azzam advocated waging jihad against the "unbelievers".^[179] Azzam issued a fatwa calling for jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, declaring it an individual obligation for all able bodied Muslims because it was a defensive jihad to repel invaders. His fatwa was endorsed by a number of clerics including leading Saudi clerics such as Sheikh Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz.^[180]

Azzam claimed that "anyone who looks into the state of Muslims today will find that their great misfortune is their abandonment of Jihad", and he also warned that "without Jihad, shirk (joining partners with Allah) will spread and become dominant".^[181] Jihad was so important that to "repel" the unbelievers was "the most important obligation after Iman [faith]".^[181]

Azzam also argued for a broader interpretation of who it was permissible to kill in jihad, an interpretation that some think may have influenced some of his students, including Osama bin Laden.^[182]

A charismatic speaker, Azzam traveled to dozens of cities in Europe and North American to encourage support for jihad in Afghanistan. He inspired young Muslims with stories of miraculous deeds during jihad—mujahideen who defeated vast columns of Soviet troops virtually single-handed, who had been run over by tanks but survived, who were shot but unscathed by bullets. Angels were witnessed riding into battle on horseback, and falling bombs were intercepted by birds, which raced ahead of the jets to form a protective canopy over the warriors.^[183] In Afghanistan he set up a "services office" for foreign fighters and with support from his former student Osama bin Laden and Saudi charities, foreign mujahideed or would-be mujahideen were provided for. Between 1982 and 1992 an estimated 35,000 individual Muslim volunteers went to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets and their Afghan regime. Thousands more attended frontier schools teeming with former and future fighters.^[184] Saudi Arabia and the other conservative Gulf monarchies also provided considerable financial support to the jihad—$600 million a year by 1982.^[185] CIA also funded Azzam's Maktab al-Khidamat^[186] and others via Operation Cyclone.

Azzam saw Afghanistan as the beginning of jihad to repel unbelievers from many countries—the southern Soviet Republics of Central Asia, Bosnia, the Philippines, Kashmir, Somalia, Eritrea, Spain, and especially his home country of Palestine.^[187] The defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan is said to have "amplified the jihadist tendency from a fringe phenomenon to a major force in the Muslim world."^[184]

Having tasted victory in Afghanistan, many of the thousands of fighters returned to their home country such as Egypt, Algeria, Kashmir or to places like Bosnia to continue jihad. Not all the former fighters agreed with Azzam's chioice of targets (Azzam was assassinated in November 1989) but former Afghan fighters led or participated in serious insurgencies in Egypt, Algeria, Kashmir, Somalia in the 1990s and later creating a "transnational jihadist stream."^[188]

In February 1998, Osama bin Laden put a "Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders" in the Al-Quds al-Arabi newspaper.^[189] On 11 September 2001, four passenger planes were hijacked in the United States and crashed, destroying the World Trade Center and damaging the Pentagon.

Shia

In Shia Islam, Jihad is one of the ten Practices of the Religion,^[22] (though not one of the five pillars). Traditionally, Twelver Shi'a doctrine has differed from that of Sunni Islam on the concept of jihad, with jihad being "seen as a lesser priority" in Shia theology and "armed activism" by Shias being "limited to a person's immediate geography".^[190]

Because of their history of being oppressed, Shias also associated jihad with certain passionate features, notably in the remembrance of Ashura. Mahmoud M. Ayoub says:

In Islamic tradition jihad or the struggle in the way of God, whether as armed struggle, or any form of opposition of the wrong, is generally regarded as one of the essential requirements of a person's faith as a Muslim. Shi'î tradition carried this requirement a step further, making jihad one of the pillars or foundations (arkan) of religion. If, therefore, Husayn's struggle against the Umayyad regime must be regarded as an act of jihad, then, In the mind of devotees, the participation of the community in his suffering and its ascent to the truth of his message must also be regarded as an extension of the holy struggle of the Imam himself. The hadith from which we took the title of this chapter states this point very clearly. Ja'far al-Sadiq is said to have declared to al-Mufaddal, one of his closest disciples, 'The sigh of the sorrowful for the wrong done us is an act of praise (tasbih) [of God], his sorrow for us is an act of worship, and his keeping of our secret is a struggle (jihad) in the way of God'; the Imâm then added, 'This hadith should be inscribed in letters of gold'.^[191]

and

Hence, the concept of jihad (holy struggle) gained a deeper and more personal meaning. Whether through weeping, the composition and recitation of poetry, showing compassion and doing good to the poor or carrying arms, the Shi'i Muslim saw himself helping the Imam in his struggle against the wrong (zulm) and gaining for himself the same merit (thawab) of those who actually fought and died for him. The ta'ziyah, in its broader sense the sharing of the entire life of the suffering family of Muhammad, has become for the Shi'i community the true meaning of compassion.^[192]

In the Syrian civil war, Shia and Sunni fighters waged jihad against each other.^[193] In Yemen, the Houthi Movement has used appeals to jihad as part of their ideology as well as their recruitment.^[194]

Evolution of the term in Islamic jurisprudence

Some observers have noted the evolution in the rules of jihad—from the original "classical" doctrine to that of 21st century Salafi jihadism. According to the legal historian Sadarat Kadri, during the last couple of centuries, incremental changes in Islamic legal doctrine (developed by Islamists who otherwise condemn any bid‘ah (innovation) in religion), have "normalized" what was once "unthinkable". "The very idea that Muslims might blow themselves up for God was unheard of before 1983, and it was not until the early 1990s that anyone anywhere had tried to justify killing innocent Muslims who were not on a battlefield."

The first or the "classical" doctrine of jihad which was developed towards the end of the 8th century, emphasized the jihad of the sword (jihad bil-saif) rather than the "jihad of the heart",^[197] but it contained many legal restrictions which were developed from interpretations of both the Quran and the Hadith, such as detailed rules involving "the initiation, the conduct, the termination" of jihad, the treatment of prisoners, the distribution of booty, etc. Unless there was a sudden attack on the Muslim community, jihad was not a "personal obligation" (fard ayn); instead it was a "collective one" (fard al-kifaya),^[121] which had to be discharged "in the way of God" (fi sabil Allah), and it could only be directed by the caliph, "whose discretion over its conduct was all but absolute." (This was designed in part to avoid incidents like the Kharijia's jihad against and killing of Caliph Ali, since they deemed that he was no longer a Muslim). Martyrdom resulting from an attack on the enemy with no concern for your own safety was praiseworthy, but dying by your own hand (as opposed to the enemy's) merited a special place in Hell.^[199] The category of jihad which is considered to be a collective obligation is sometimes simplified as "offensive jihad" in Western texts.^[200]

Islamic theologian Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir has been identified as the key theorist and ideologue behind modern jihadist violence.^[201] His theological and legal justifications influenced Abu Musab al-Zarqawi of al-Qaeda as well as several jihadi terrorist groups, including ISIS.^[201] Zarqawi used a manuscript of al-Muhajir's ideas at AQI training camps that were later deployed by ISIS, referred to as The Jurisprudence of Jihad or The Jurisprudence of Blood.^{[201][202][203]}

The book has been described as rationalising "the murder of non-combatants" by The Guardian's Mark Towsend, citing Salah al-Ansari of Quilliam, who notes: "There is a startling lack of study and concern regarding this abhorrent and dangerous text [The Jurisprudence of Blood] in almost all Western and Arab scholarship".^[202] Charlie Winter of The Atlantic describes it as a "theological playbook used to justify the group's abhorrent acts".^[201] He states:

Ranging from ruminations on the merits of beheading, torturing, or burning prisoners to thoughts on assassination, siege warfare, and the use of biological weapons, Muhajir's intellectual legacy is a crucial component of the literary corpus of ISIS—and, indeed, whatever comes after it—a way to render practically anything permissible, provided, that is, it can be spun as beneficial to the jihad. [...] According to Muhajir, committing suicide to kill people is not only a theologically sound act, but a commendable one, too, something to be cherished and celebrated regardless of its outcome. [...] neither Zarqawi nor his inheritors have looked back, liberally using Muhajir's work to normalize the use of suicide tactics in the time since, such that they have become the single most important military and terrorist method—defensive or offensive—used by ISIS today. The way that Muhajir theorized it was simple—he offered up a theological fix that allows any who desire it to sidestep the Koranic injunctions against suicide.^[201]

Psychologist Chris E. Stout also discusses the al Muhajir-inspired text in his book, Terrorism, Political Violence, and Extremism. He assesses that jihadists regard their actions as being "for the greater good"; that they are in a "weakened in the earth" situation that renders terrorism a valid means of solution.^[203]

Current usage

The term 'jihad' has accrued both violent and non-violent meanings. According to John Esposito, it can simply mean striving to live a moral and virtuous life, spreading and defending Islam as well as fighting injustice and oppression, among other things.^[204] The relative importance of these two forms of jihad is a matter of controversy. Rudoph Peters writes that, in the contemporary world, traditionalist Muslims understand jihad from classical works on fiqh; modernist Muslims regard jihad as a just war in international law and emphasize its defensive aspects; and fundamentalists view it as an expansion of Islam and realization of Islamic ideals.^[133] David Cook writes that Muslims have understood jihad in a military sense, both in classical texts and in contemporary ones. For Cook the idea that jihad is primarily non-violent comes primarily from Sufi texts and the Western scholars who study them, or from Muslim apologists.^[205]Gallup has stated that its surveys show that the concept of jihad among Muslims "is considerably more nuanced than the single sense in which Western commentators invariably invoke the term."^[20]

Muslim public opinion

A poll by Gallup asked Muslims in eight countries what jihad meant to them. In Lebanon, Kuwait, Jordan, and Morocco, the most frequent response was to "duty toward God", a "divine duty", or a "worship of God", with no militaristic connotations. In Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Indonesia, many of the responses includes "sacrificing one's life for the sake of Islam/God/a just cause" or "fighting against the opponents of Islam".^[20] Other common meanings of "jihad" in the Muslim world include "a commitment to hard work", "promoting peace", and "living the principles of Islam".^[20][206] The terminology is also applied to the fight for women's liberation.^[207]

Other spiritual, social, economic struggles

Shia Muslim scholar Mahmoud M. Ayoud states that "The goal of true jihad is to attain a harmony between Islam (submission), iman (faith), and ihsan (righteous living)." Jihad is a process encompassing both individual and social reform, this is called jihad fi sabil allah ("struggle in the way of God"), and can be undertaken by the means of the Quran (jihad bi-al-qur'an).^[208] According to Ayoud the greatest Jihad is the struggle of every Muslim against the social, moral, and political evils. However, depending on social and political circumstances, Jihad may be regarded as a sixth fundamental obligation (farid) incumbent on the entire Muslim community (ummah) when their integrity is in danger, in this case jihad becomes an "absolute obligation" (fard 'ayn), or when social and religious reform is gravely hampered. Otherwise it is a "limited obligation" (fard kifayah), incumbent upon those who are directly involved. These rules apply to armed struggle or "jihad of the sword".^[208]

In modern times, Pakistani scholar and professor Fazlur Rahman Malik has used the term to describe the struggle to establish a "just moral-social order",^[209] while President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia has used it to describe the struggle for economic development in that country.^[210]

According to the BBC, a third meaning of jihad is the struggle to build a good society.^[211] In a commentary of the hadith Sahih Muslim, entitled al-Minhaj, the medieval Islamic scholar Yahya ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi stated that "one of the collective duties of the community as a whole (fard kifaya) is to lodge a valid protest, to solve problems of religion, to have knowledge of Divine Law, to command what is right and forbid wrong conduct".^[212]

Scholar Natana J. Delong-Bas lists a number of types of "jihad" that have been proposed by Muslims

• educational jihad (jihad al-tarbiyyah);
• missionary jihad or calling the people to Islam (jihad al-da'wah)^[213]

Other "types" mentioned include

Usage by some non-Muslims

• The United States Department of Justice has used its own ad hoc definitions of jihad in indictments of individuals involved in terrorist activities:
  • "As used in this First Superseding Indictment, 'Jihad' is the Arabic word meaning 'holy war'. In this context, jihad refers to the use of violence, including paramilitary action against persons, governments deemed to be enemies of the fundamentalist version of Islam."^[219]
  • "As used in this Superseding Indictment, 'violent jihad' or 'jihad' include planning, preparing for, and engaging in, acts of physical violence, including murder, maiming, kidnapping, and hostage-taking."^[220] in the indictment against several individuals including José Padilla.
• "Fighting and warfare might sometimes be necessary, but it was only a minor part of the whole jihad or struggle," according to Karen Armstrong.^[221]
• "Jihad is a propagandistic device which, as need be, resorts to armed struggle—two ingredients common to many ideological movements," according to Maxime Rodinson.^[222]
• Academic Benjamin R. Barber used the term Jihad to point out the resistant movement by fundamentalist ethnic groups who want to protect their traditions, heritage and identity from globalization (which he refers to as 'McWorld').^[223]

Views of other groups

Ahmadiyya

Main article: Ahmadiyya view on Jihad

In Ahmadiyya Islam, jihad is primarily one's personal inner struggle and should not be used violently for political motives. Violence is the last option only to be used to protect religion and one's own life in extreme situations of persecution.^[224]

Quranist

Quranists do not believe that the word jihad means holy war. They believe it means to struggle, or to strive. They believe it can incorporate both military and non-military aspects. When it refers to the military aspect, it is understood primarily as defensive warfare.^[225][226]

See also

References

Citations

Abu Musab Al-Suri, one of the main Al-Qa'ida ideologues, has championed a massive societal indoctrination campaign to promote the tenets of the militant jihad among Muslims worldwide.[1] This ideology seems to have made deep inroads around the world: self-described jihadis rely heavily upon and promote 'martyrdom' (suicide) operations, claiming that the rewards referred to in Islamic scriptures will be accorded to those who carry out such acts. Suicide terrorists are seen not as cold-blooded killers but as 'martyrs' and heroes in the eyes of many.[2] This shift in values occurred slowly: suicide terrorism first found acceptance in Palestine; over time, it was increasingly utilised for fighting 'occupation' in Chechnya, Kashmir, Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. Chillingly, there is also a minority Muslim endorsement for suicide terrorism inside the UK. Likewise female involvement in terrorism has become increasingly more commonplace and the debate amongst terrorism's perpetrators has even extended to whether biological and radiological weapons are justifiable in fighting the militant jihad. Al-Qa'ida and its affiliates are expert at taking advantage of local conflicts and grievances and adapting their ideology to local circumstances. To fight terrorism we must therefore understand the pervasiveness of so-called Islamist ideological strands and attempt to reverse radicalisation in the mainstream Islamic discourse.

Counter-Radicalisation Strategies

As we increasingly begin to understand the processes of, and threats from, violent radicalisation, governments have begun to appreciate that it is necessary to mount a comprehensive fight against it. This comprehensive strategy prioritises four interlinked approaches:[3]

• Prevention: particularly among vulnerable populations
• Protection: inoculating society again violent ideologies
• Identification: recognising and disengaging (by arrest, amnesty programmes or simple intimidation) those who are on the brink of perpetrating violent acts on behalf of militant groups
• De-radicalisation: rehabilitating and converting those who have already committed such acts.

Counter-radicalisation efforts must tackle the spread of militant jihadi ideology in the critical recruiting environments of the Internet, within communities and inside prisons.

The Virtual University of Militant Jihad

The Internet has become the new training ground for Al-Qa'ida Global, the place where militant jihadis propagate their ideology and debate about new recruits. Militant jihadi internet penetration is worldwide and militant jihadi materials are translated into many languages. Some have dubbed the Internet the 'virtual university of militant jihad'. In a Muslim district of Brussels the author found pop-up screen invitations on computers in internet cafés asking in various languages 'Would you like to join the worldwide Jihad?'. Likewise former extremists in Europe have told the author that they were recruited by extremists who introduced themselves in internet cafés and used highly emotive downloads to convince their vulnerable new recruits to join in extremists activities. In Birmingham and Leeds second-generation Pakistani immigrants spoke to the author about their peers downloading militant jihadi videos and watching them clandestinely in groups in which the young men goaded each other to leave for Afghanistan or Pakistan to join the militant jihad.

The ideological debate rages on the Internet with very few answers able to compete with the narratives and violent solutions offered by militant jihadis for real and perceived grievances. Clearly we need to empower experts to 'deconstruct' the claims and emotional manipulation that occurs on militant jihadi sites. Many of the arguments made are emotionally loaded and packed with appeals to the senses: videos and photos bring the conflict zones where militants are active into non-conflict zones (the home, the street, the school), cleverly making use of secondary traumatisation techniques to motivate and encourage new recruits. We need to enter the ideological debate and become as creative as the militant jihadis to effectively counter their messages. From a psychological standpoint this requires offering an scholarly alternative debate that comes to non-violent conclusions but that provides emotionally compelling and sensory-laden multimedia to obtain the same level of cognitive interest, attitudinal shift and behavioural change. One way to do this is to make use of militant jihadi internet clips and deconstruct them in order to reveal the emotional manipulation inherent in their claims. The energy and anger stirred up by their videos and photos can then be rechanneled into effective political, rather than violent, actions.

Street and Community Models of Prevention, De-radicalisation and Disengagement

Militant jihadi radicalisation and recruitment is taking place in many of our communities: in schools, mosques, universities, internet cafés - literally on the street and other areas where vulnerable people congregate. We must develop community-based models of intervention to prevent recruitment and rescue those about to fall prey - and those who already have - to militant jihadis. Surveillance and the use of informers has been the traditional method of 'catching' terrorists but we need to intervene well before terrorists cells and plots are formed. We must become as creative as the recruiters. While travelling through the UK the author has found it possible to speak with young UK Muslims who have been indoctrinated into the militant jihad, taken to training camps outside the UK and involved in small arms and explosives training and fought militant jihad outside the UK; some who want to die as 'martyrs' and others who have been heavily under the influence of the militant jihad. If it is possible for a white, Christian, American female researcher to find and interview such people, it is certainly possible for social workers, psychologists and trained imams to do the same and to do much more once they are found: to actively intervene to turn them back from extremist views.

One way to do this is to identify, empower and send out trained imams and psychologists who are themselves from those areas where radicals are actively proliferating. These individuals can be active on the streets, intervene in recruitment, and work with those at risk. We have already seen in the UK how extremists have used camping, paintball, and other outdoor challenge activities to augment militant jihadi indoctrination and militant training. Youth centres and alternative activities that keep youth away from what extremists are offering are also ways to reach vulnerable young people, to protect them and bring them back from the brink of serious radicalisation. Downloaded militant jihadi materials can also be deconstructed for young people in youth centres, groups, and individual mentoring so those who have been enamoured with the militant jihadi narratives to bring social justice through violence can begin to see where their logic is wrong and that their religiously based claims are unfounded.

We should also utilise help lines and online information services to provide avenues for concerned family members and friends to call for and receive help (even anonymously) if they fear someone's involvement in militant activities. Often family members and friends have an idea well before a terror act is committed that their loved one has become an extremist but they have no one but the police to turn to and most would not consider that a viable method of obtaining help. Hotlines that are staffed by concerned psychologists and imams, preferably from within the Muslim communities they are offering help to, can give advice over the phone, the Internet or face to face (in a safe and anonymous setting) to the concerned friend or family member to help draw the friend or family member back from extremism. Community policing is also of paramount importance to win the hearts of the community and gather anecdotal and grassroots information to prevent the planning or prosecution of terrorists plots.

Recruitment in Prisons

Many countries throughout the world are today facing a prison population of individuals convicted of terrorist-related charges. These include ideologues who promote militant jihadi ideas, operatives who plotted to or actually carried out terrorist threats, and financial, ideological or operational supporters of such activities. The most infamous case of radicalisation inside prison is the now-deceased Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi who made his transition from street thug to militant jihadi while incarcerated. There are unfortunately many more like him. Prison authorities are struggling with how best to address militant jihadi prisoners and those vulnerable to their aggressive recruitment tactics. UK prisons are awash with the sermons of Abdullah Faisal and others. The Dutch authorities faced a human rights outcry when they segregated the 'Hofstad Group' in order to prevent the spread of extremism in their prisons. In Iraq the prison population of over 20,000 inmates is rife with militant jihadis who are taking full advantage of their captive audience to spread militant propaganda and increase their influence.

Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Jordan, the United States, Egypt, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Netherlands, the UK and many other countries have all begun to address the need for prison rehabilitation and prevention programmes to stymie the spread of militant jihadi activities within prisons. The author designed and pilot tested one of these efforts in Iraq for the 20,000 detainees held there by US forces. This programme relied on a multi-pronged approach, including using imams to engage with prisoners, challenging them on the claim that Islamic scriptures support the militant jihadi ideology and attempting to make them reassess this belief. Likewise psychologists worked with the prisoners to address the reasons why they ascribed to the 'psychological first aid' inherent in the militant jihadi ideology. The US military also offered literacy and skills training and amnesty to successful graduates of the programme. Europeans are beginning to design similar initiatives: the UK, for instance, is using imams to talk with those who are converting to extremist versions of Islam, challenging them about why they find the militant jihadi ideology attractive and teaching prisoners to evaluate for themselves whether militant claims adhere to sound Islamic thinking. The common elements of most prison programmes addressing militant jihadis incorporate a religious challenge to their militant jihadi beliefs. The most comprehensive also include psychological treatment, economic incentives, skills training and after-release mentoring.

Militant jihadi terrorism is a serious threat that calls for strong efforts to prevent, inoculate, disengage and de-radicalise militant jihadis and their recruits on the street, over the Internet, in prisons, in the military and wherever else they may be active in order to try to turn them back from terrorism and political violence. We must have the courage and creativity to do so.

Anne Speckhard
Adjunct Associate Professor of Psychiatry
Georgetown University Medical Center

NOTES
[1] The author uses term 'militant jihad' as a reference to terrorist groups (who are often also militants) who claim that they are carrying out a 'jihad' and acting in the name of Islam by attacking both civilian and military targets. When referring to militant jihad, the author is fully aware and respectful of the religious and completely non-terrorist related references to the greater jihad in the Qu'ran, which refers to the constant and ever vigilant need for an inner struggle to master oneself and attain a moral lifestyle, and assures her readers that in writing about those who believe in a call to militant jihadi terrorism she has tried to find the best term that describes both their ideology and actions and by doing so means no disrespect to the Islamic faith nor to the majority of Muslims that follow Islam peacefully. For more on the writings of Al-Suri, see Reuven Paz, Reading their Lips: The Credibility of Militant Jihadi Websites as 'Soft Power' in the War of the Minds, The Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM) Occasional Papers (Vol. 5, No. 5, 2007); and Brynjar Lia, 'Al-Qaida's Appeal: Understanding its Unique Selling Points', Perspectives on Terrorism (Vol. 2, No. 8, 2007).
[2] The author has spent the last five years interviewing over 350 terrorists, extremists, their supporters, hostages, family members and their close associates in Lebanon, Palestine, Israel, Iraq, Russia, Belarus, North Ossetia, Morocco, Belgium, the UK, the Netherlands and France.
[3] The UK has instituted its own strategy named CONTEST which has four components: Pursue - stopping terrorist attacks; Prevent - stopping people from becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism; Protect - strengthening our protection against attack; and Prepare - mitigating the impact of events.

RESEARCH PAPER

KEYWORDS

ABSTRACT

The fight that Europe and the West must wage against jihadist terrorism will take some time, but if we live up to our values of integration and democracy, we will come out of it soon. As Giovanni Falcone, the Italian judge killed by the Mafia, once said about the Mafia: “It is a human phenomenon, and as all human phenomena has a start and an evolution, it will have also an end”.

Jihadis have been using Twitter at least since 2010, with the Shabaab joining the site in December 2011, but never before to this extent. One early adapter of Twitter, the Afghan Taliban, began to establish their social media presence in December 2010, through which they issued brief bulletins about their actions and alerts for forthcoming communiqués. Many of the most prominent jihadi groups have followed the same path, including the Shabaab al-Mujahideen, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The content of these Twitter accounts has tended to closely mirror material released to jihadi forums. For example, the Afghan Taliban may post the text of a communiqué to their website, to a jihadi forum, and to the Twitter account of one of their spokesmen. Mirroring jihadi groups, elements of the online jihadi community have also migrated to social media sites, with prominent forums such as Shumukh al-Islam and Ansar al- Mujahideen English Forum creating Twitter accounts to publicise notable releases and discussions. Concurrently, many individual jihadis and jihadi supporters have joined Twitter, enthusiastically circulating propaganda among themselves and promoting it to potential recruits. Yet, the benefits conferred by social networking come with a substantial cost: social networking platforms can sow great confusion if known official accounts are deleted and re-established or if there are multiple accounts claiming to represent a specific jihadi group. In order to reach the new official accounts, followers must be able to distinguish the legitimate social media accounts of jihadi groups from non-authenticated users, which is a level of ambiguity that is not found on jihadi forums.

REFERENCES (26)

This webpage has been prepared for reference only. Users should consult the Acts as passed by Parliament, which are published in the "Assented to" Acts service, Part III of the Canada Gazette and the annual Statutes of Canada. Users should also consult the regulations, as registered by the Clerk of the Privy Council and published in Part II of the Canada Gazette, available in most public libraries.

Several of the listed entities are known under different names. As well, some spellings of names may differ. Click on the name for a description of the entity, all different names and spellings, and the date when the entity was added to the list.

Notice of amendments

• 2021-06-25: Added four new entities
  Added to the list Aryan Strikeforce, James Mason, Three Percenters, and Islamic State – Democratic Republic of the Congo.

• 2021-06-04: Completed the statutory review of nine entities
  Completed the review of Al Qaida, Asbat Al-Ansar, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, Hamas, Hizballah, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command.

• 2021-02-03: Added thirteen new entities
  Added to the list Atomwaffen Division, The Base, Russian Imperial Movement, Proud Boys, Islamic State East Asia, Islamic State – Bangladesh, Islamic State in Libya, Jama’at Nusrat Al-Islam Wal-Muslimin, Front de Libération du Macina, Ansar Dine, Islamic State West Africa Province, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, and Hizbul Mujahideen.
  
  
• 2020-11-25: Completed the statutory review of seven entities
  Completed the review of Al-Ashtar Brigades, Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, Al Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent, Al Shabaab, Fatemiyoun Division, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, and Islamic State – Khorasan Province.
  
  
• 2020-11-25: Amended aliases
  Removed “the Haqq Brigade of Homs” as an alias of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham.

Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB)

Also known as
The Abdullah Azzam Brigades; the Brigades of Abdullah Azzam; the Brigades of the Martyr Abdullah Azzam; the Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions; the Ziad al-Jarrah Battalion; the Yusuf al-'Uyayri Battalions; the Yusuf al-Ayiri Battalion; the Battalion of Sheikh Yusuf al-'Ayiri; and the Marwan Hadid Brigades.

Description
The AAB is an Al Qaida affiliated militant group that follows Salafist ideology. The group is a fluid network organized into a number of regional battalions, including the Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions based in Lebanon. The AAB has claimed responsibility for several rocket attacks in northern Israel and has also repeatedly articulated its intent to carry out attacks against Western targets in the Middle East. Since the start of protests in Syria, the AAB's communiqués have supported regime overthrow. In 2014, the AAB claimed joint responsibility with Jabhat al-Nusra for rocket attacks in Hermel, Lebanon. The AAB also claimed responsibility for two suicide bombings near the Iranian cultural centre in Beirut, Lebanon, in February, 2014.

Date listed
2015-06-29

Date reviewed
2018-11-25

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)

Also known as
Fatah Revolutionary Council, Revolutionary Council, Revolutionary Council of Fatah, Al-Fatah Revolutionary Council, Fatah-the Revolutionary Council, Black June, Arab Revolutionary Brigades, Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims, Black September, Egyptian Revolution, Arab Fedayeen Cells, Palestine Revolutionary Council, Organization of Jund al Haq, Arab Revolutionary Council.

Description
From the mid-1970s to the early 1990s, the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) was one of the most feared transnational terrorist organizations in the world, killing or wounding about 900 persons in terrorist attacks in 20 countries. Founded by Abu Nidal in 1974, the goal of the ANO was to destroy the State of Israel, viewing armed struggle as the only method to liberate the people of Palestine. ANO was responsible for the November 1985 hijacking of an Egypt Air flight, which resulted in the death of at least 58 people, including a Canadian woman and her infant son. ANO was also responsible for the July 1988 explosion of two bombs near a cruise ship in Aegina, Greece killing 9, and the 1994 assassination of a Jordanian embassy diplomat in Beirut.

Date listed
2003-02-12

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

Also known as
Al Harakat Al Islamiyya (AHAI), Al Harakat-ul Al Islamiyya, Al-Harakatul-Islamia, Al Harakat Al Aslamiya, Abou Sayaf Armed Band (ASAB), Abu Sayaff Group, Abu Sayyef Group and Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters (MCFF).

Description
Founded in the early 1990s, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) is a militant Islamist group with links to Al Qaida and Jemaah Islamiyyah. Ostensibly, the group's goal is the establishment of an Islamic state governed by Sharia Law in the south Philippines. In practice, however, the ASG primarily uses terrorism for profit: kidnap-for-ransom, guerrilla warfare, mass-casualty bombings, and beheadings are particularly favoured tactics. In 2016, two Canadian nationals were beheaded after being kidnapped by the group. More recently, on May 23, 2017, members of ASG's Islamic State (IS)-aligned Basilan faction, in alliance with other IS-aligned militants, launched a siege on Marawi City, Philippines, that lasted five months. At least 45 civilians were killed during the siege, and 1,780 hostages were rescued.

Date listed
2003-02-12

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Al-Ashtar Brigades (AAB)

Also known as
Saraya al-Ashtar, Al Ashtar Brigades, The Ashtar Brigades, Saraya Waad Allah, Wa’ad Allah Brigades, Islamic Allah Brigades, Imam al-Mahdi Brigades, al-Haydariyah Brigades

Description
Al-Ashtar Brigades (AAB) is a Shia militant group supported by Iran which aims to overthrow Bahrain’s Sunni monarchy. AAB was established in 2013 and has incited violence towards the Bahraini leadership. AAB has claimed responsibility for several bombings targeting security forces, including the February 14, 2014, attack on a minibus carrying police officers, which wounded several; and the March 3, 2014, improvised explosive device attack which killed 3 policemen and injured several others. AAB also claimed responsibility for the killing of an off-duty police officer near Bahrain’s capital city, Manama, on January 29, 2017. In 2019, AAB vowed to target American and British interests in Bahrain.

Date listed
2019-06-21

Date reviewed
2020-11-25

Al-Murabitoun

Also known as
Al-Murabitoun is also known among other names as Mourabitounes, Al-Mourabitoun, Al-Morabitoune, Al-Mourabitoune and Les Almoravides.

Description
Al-Murabitoun, based in West Africa, is a terrorist organization established through a merger between the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa and al'Muwaqi'un Bil-Dima in August 2013. Al-Murabitoun's goal is to spread jihad across North Africa. The group was formed to strengthen efforts against French military forces and interests in the region. Al-Murabitoun has carried out terrorist activity, such as the February 8, 2014 kidnapping of 5 Malian aid workers near Gao, Mali. In 2015, Al-Murabitoun reaffirmed its continued adherence to the jihadist ideology of Al Qaida (AQ). It has also conducted joint operations with Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Ivory Coast. On March 2, 2017, Al-Murabitoun merged with three other groups, including AQIM's Sahara branch, to form Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an umbrella group which pledged allegiance to AQ.

Date listed
2014-06-02

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Al-Muwaqi'un Bil Dima

Also known as
Al Mouaquioune bi addimaa, Katibat al-Muqaoon bil-Dumaa, al-Muwaqun Bi-Dima, Al-Muawaqqi'un bi 'l-Dima al-Mouwakoune bi-Dimaa, al-Mua'qi'oon Biddam, Those Who Sign With Blood, El Mouwakaoune Bidame , Those Who Have Signed Through Blood, the Signatories for Blood, the Signatories in Blood and Those Who Sign in Blood.

Description
In December 2012, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a former commander of Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), created al-Muwaqi'un Bil Dima (MBD), with the goal of deterring Western and African military intervention in northern Mali and imposing Sharia Law in North Africa. The MBD has carried out suicide bombing attacks and assaulted civilian facilities. For instance, the MBD claimed responsibility for the January 16, 2013 attack on the Tigantourine gas facility near the town of In Amenas in eastern Algeria. MBD militants, using assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades and anti-tank mines, took dozens of foreign and Algerian workers hostage that resulted in the deaths of at least 48 hostages. In August 2013, MBD merged with Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) to form Al-Murabitoun.

Date listed
2013-11-07

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Al Qaida

Also known as
Al Jihad (AJ), Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), Vanguards of Conquest (VOC), The Islamic Army, Islamic Salvation Foundation, The Base, Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites, Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places, World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, Usama Bin Ladin Network, Usama Bin Ladin Organization and Qa'idat al-Jihad

Description
Founded in 1988 by Usama bin Laden, Al Qaida serves as the strategic hub and driver for the global Islamist terrorist movement. The group's goals include uniting Muslims to fight the United States and its allies, overthrowing regimes it deems "non-Islamic" and expelling Westerners and non-Muslims from Muslim countries. Al Qaida activities include, but are not limited to, suicide attacks, simultaneous bombings, kidnappings, and hijackings. Al Qaida has forged ties and strategic control over other like-minded Islamist terrorist groups and provides encouragement and inspiration to other affiliated and aligned groups around the world. The Al Qaida network has been directly or indirectly associated with the 1998 bombings of two United States embassies, as well as the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole. It was directly involved in the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks of September 11, 2001 and in a foiled plot to bomb the New York subway system in 2009. In April 2017 Al Qaida organized a suicide bombing inside a metro train in St. Petersburg, Russia, killing at least 10 civilians, and injuring 40 more. Al Qaida continues to publically encourage its followers to carry out attacks against its perceived enemies.

Date listed
2002-07-23

Date reviewed
2021-06-04

Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

Also known as
Ansar al-Shari'a (AAS), Al-Qaida of Jihad Organization in the Arabian Peninsula, Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Jazirat al- Arab, Al-Qaida Organization in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al-Qaida in the South Arabian Peninsula, and Al-Qaida in Yemen (AQY).

Description
A Yemen-based affiliate of Usama bin Laden's Al Qaida (AQ) network, Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) announced its formation in January 2009. Its primary objectives are to cleanse the Arabian Peninsula of foreign influence – particularly Western military personnel and civilian contractors – and to establish a single Islamic caliphate in place of the existing regimes in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. AQAP's most prominent attacks have been suicide bombings; however, the group has also engaged in guerilla-style raids on military and security targets. It is also responsible for the failed December 25, 2009, attempt to detonate an explosive abroad a Northwest Airlines flight as the plane prepared to land in Detroit, and the 2015 attack on the office of the magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris, France. More recently, on February 2, 2020, AQAP released a video claiming responsibility for the attack on the US Naval Air Station Pensacola, Florida.

Date listed
2010-12-23

Date reviewed
2020-11-25

Al Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)

Also known as
Qaedat al-Jihad in the Indian Subcontinent and Jamaat Qaidat al Jihad fi Shibh al Qarrah al Hindiyah (Organization of the Base of Jihad in the Indian Subcontinent)

Description
In a video released on September 3, 2014, Al Qaida (AQ) leader Ayman al-Zawahiri announced the creation of a new AQ affiliated group, AQIS. Al-Zawahiri named Asim Umar as leader of AQIS and Usama Mahmoud as spokesman. Since the announcement of its creation, AQIS has claimed responsibility for the September 6, 2014 attempt to hijack Pakistan Naval Ship Zulfiqar; the October 31, 2015 attacks on two publishers in Dhaka, Bangladesh; and several assassinations. In October 2019, there were reports that six AQIS militants had arrived in Karachi from Afghanistan with plans to reactivate their sleeper cell to carry out terrorist attacks. AQIS continues to call for violence against India.

Date listed
2016-12-28

Date reviewed
2020-11-25

Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

Also known as
Tanzim Qaedat bi-Bilad al-Maghrab al-Islami, Tanzim al-Qa´ida fi bilad al-Maghreb al-Islamiya, The Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Qa´ida Organisation in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Qa´ida in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Qa´ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, al-Qaïda dans les pays du Maghreb islamique, Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat

Description
AQIM is a militant Sunni Islamist extremist group which originated as the Groupe Islamique Armeé (Armed Islamic Group or GIA), an armed Islamist resistance movement to the secular Algerian government. In 1998, a splinter of the GIA declared its independence from the original group, believing the GIA's brutal tactics were hurting the Islamist cause. The Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat (Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), as the new group named itself, gained support from the Algerian population by vowing to continue fighting the government while avoiding the indiscriminate killing of civilians. The GSPC officially merged with Al Qaida in September 2006, subsequently changing its name to Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and announcing the name change in January 2007. AQIM is the most effective and largest extremist armed group inside Algeria. Since its merger with Al Qaida, AQIM has also adopted a global jihad ideology. The group has maintained a high operational tempo since its emergence under the name of AQIM, employing conventional terrorist tactics including guerilla-style ambushes and the use of improvised explosive devices against military personnel and truck bombs against government targets, in Algeria and West African countries. AQIM continues to kidnap Westerners and hold them for ransom in return for the release of imprisoned Islamic militants. In 2016, 29 people were killed, including 6 Canadians, in an AQIM attack on a hotel in Burkina Faso. In March 2017, AQIM's Mali-based affiliate, JNIM, was formed. On March 2, 2018, a coordinated attack by JNIM on the army headquarters and the French Embassy in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso's capital, killed at least 8 people and wounding more than 80 others.

Date listed
2002-07-23

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Al Shabaab

Also known as
Harakat Shabaab al Mujahidin, al Shabab, Shabaab, the Youth, Mujahidin al Shabaab Movement, Mujahideen Youth Movement, MYM, Mujahidin Youth, Hizbul Shabaab, Hisb'ul Shabaab, al-Shabaab al-Islamiya, Youth Wing, al Shabaab al-Islaam, al-Shabaab al-Jihad, the Unity of Islamic Youth, the Popular Resistance Movement in the Land of the Two Migrations

Description
Al Shabaab is an organized but shifting Islamist group dedicated to establishing a Somali caliphate, waging war against the enemies of Islam, and removing all foreign forces and Western influence from Somalia. It is currently the strongest, best organized, financed and armed military group in Somalia, controlling the largest stretch of territory in southern Somalia. Al Shabaab has carried out suicide bombings and attacks using land mines and remote-controlled roadside bombs, as well as targeted assassinations against Ethiopian and Somali security forces, other government officials, journalists, and civil society leaders. It has also carried out suicide bombings in Uganda in retaliation for the presence of Ugandan peacekeeping forces in Somalia. In October 2017, Al Shabaab detonated two vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices in Mogadishu, killing 512 people and injuring 312 others. More recently, on December 28, 2019, Al Shabaab claimed responsibility for a bombing at a busy intersection on the outskirts of Mogadishu, Somalia, killing at least 78 people and injuring at least 51 people. The group is believed to be closely linked with Al Qaida and formally pledged allegiance to Usama bin Laden and his terrorist network.

Date listed
2010-03-05

Date reviewed
2020-11-25

Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade (AAMB)

Also known as
Al-Aqsa Intifada Martyrs' Group, Al-Aqsa Brigades, Martyrs of al-Aqsa group, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Battalion and Armed Militias of the Al-Aqsa Martyr Battalions

Description
The Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade (AAMB) emerged at the outset of the 2000 Palestinian al-Aqsa intifada and consists of loose cells of Palestinian militants loyal to, but not under the direct control of, the secular-nationalist Fatah party. The AAMB attacks Israeli military targets and Israeli settlers, aiming to expel Israeli presence from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and to establish an independent and sovereign Palestinian state there. The AAMB has conducted armed, suicide and rocket attacks to achieve its objectives. In March 2017, the AAMB claimed responsibility for an attack on a regional municipal government in Israel's southern district  AAMB also claimed responsibility for at least one rocket fired into Southern Israel in December 2017.

Date listed
2003-04-02

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (AGAI)

Also known as
Islamic Group, (IG).

Description
Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (AGAI) started in the early 1970s as an Islamist student movement on Egyptian campuses. By the late 1970s, the organization began to advocate change by force. Its primary goal was to overthrow the Egyptian government and replace it with an Islamic state governed by Sharia Law. Past AGAI attacks primarily targeted the police, government officials, informants, government sympathizers, foreign tourists, and Coptic Christians. AGAI claimed responsibility for the February 1993 bombing of a Café in Cairo which killed at least 3 people and wounded 15 others, including a Canadian. AGAI was also responsible for the e killing of 58 foreign tourists and four Egyptians in Luxor, Egypt, in November 1997.

Date listed
2002-07-23

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Ansar al-Islam (AI)

Also known as
The Partisans of Islam, Helpers of Islam, Supporters of Islam, Soldiers of God, Kurdistan Taliban, Soldiers of Islam, Kurdistan Supporters of Islam, Supporters of Islam in Kurdistan, Followers of Islam in Kurdistan, Ansar al-Sunna.

Description
One of the most prominent anti-Coalition groups in Iraq, Ansar al-Islam (AI) is the product of a 2001 merger between various Kurdish militant Islamist factions. It maintains links to Al Qaida and elements of the group have also pledged allegiance to the Islamic State . AI's current goals are to expel all foreign forces from Iraq, counter the growing influence of Iraq's Shia and secular Kurdish communities, and to establish an independent Iraqi state governed by Sharia Law. In 2002, AI attempted to assassinate the Prime Minister of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan region of Kurdistan. In 2004, AI was responsible for a coordinated double suicide bombing on the respective headquarters of two Kurdish political parties that killed more than 60 people and wounded over 200 others. AI is also well-known for kidnapping and executing foreign hostages, often beheading their victims and posting video of the act on the Internet. On February 20, 2018, AI released a video on a Telegram channel displaying its Syria-based weapons development.

Date listed
2004-05-17

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Ansar Dine

Also known as
Ansar al-Dine, Ansar al-Din, Ancar Dine, Ansar ul-Din, Ansar Eddine, Defenders of the Faith, Jum’a Ansar al-din al-salafiya, Harakat Ansar al-Dine, Harakat Ansar al-Din, Ansar Din, Ansar ed dine, Ansar Dine Sud, Ansar Dine katiba (brigade) Khalid Ibn al-Walid.

Description
Ansar Dine, a constituent of Jama’at Nusrat Al-Islam Wal-Muslimin (JNIM), is a Mali-based Salafi Islamist extremist group. Its main objectives are to implement Sharia law across Mali and to expel foreign influence from the country. Although largely focused on Mali, Ansar Dine has worked in coordination with JNIM, and has expressed support for a global jihadist ideology. Ansar Dine mainly targets Malian, French and United Nations forces. It has also targeted civilians, including Westerners, for kidnapping. Iyad ag Ghaly, the leader of Ansar Dine, also leads JNIM.

Date listed
2021-02-03

Date reviewed
Not yet reviewed

Armed Islamic Group (GIA)

Also known as
Groupe islamique armé

Description
The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) is a radical Islamist group based in Algeria. The GIA's primary objective is to overthrow the Algerian government and replace it with an Islamic state. The group employs a variety of methods and tactics in its attacks, including bombings, shootings, hijackings and kidnappings. In August 1995, a gas canister bomb containing nails and bolts was planted in a trash can and detonated near the Arc de Triomphe in Paris. The GIA is known to have targeted intellectuals, journalists, and foreigners, both within and outside Algeria. The group has links with terrorist organizations throughout the Middle East and Central/Southern Asia, including Al Qaida. The GIA has been dormant since approximately 2005.

Date listed
2002-07-23

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Aryan Strikeforce

Also known as
Aryan Strike Force, ASF

Description
Founded in the United Kingdom between 2006 and 2010, the Aryan Strikeforce (ASF) is a neo-Nazi group which aims to carry out violent activities to overthrow governments, start a race war, and eradicate ethnic minorities. The ASF describes itself as a white nationalist organization with the goal to protect the honour of their women, children, and the future of their race and nation, using violence as a necessary tool to achieve its goals. ASF subscribes to the philosophy of decentralized leaderless resistance and has had chapters in the United Kingdom and the United States, and contacts in Eastern Europe, South America, South Africa, and Canada. Members of the group have been convicted of crimes in the United Kingdom and the United States involving the production of chemical weapons, preparing and possessing material useful to commit acts of terrorism, facilitating the transfer of bomb-making instructions, and attempting to secure illegal firearms. Of particular note, the ASF had planned a suicide bombing attack on counter-protestors during a November 2016 white supremacist rally in Pennsylvania. The group is associated with Combat 18, the armed branch of Blood & Honour, both listed entities in Canada, that has carried out violent actions including murders and bombings.

Date listed
2021-06-25

Date reviewed
Not yet reviewed

Asbat Al-Ansar (AAA) (The League of Partisans)

Also known as
Osbat Al Ansar, Usbat Al Ansar, Esbat Al-Ansar, Isbat Al Ansar, Usbat-ul-Ansar, Band of Helpers, Band of Partisans, League of the Followers

Description
God's Partisans, Gathering of Supporters, Partisan's League, Asbat Al-Ansar (AAA) is a Lebanese Islamist extremist group linked to Al Qaida. Its main objective is to promote the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon and it is opposed to Christian, secular, and Shia institutions in the country. Past targets have included the Lebanese state, as well as elements within the country AAA considers un-Islamic. For example, two AAA members attacked a Sidon court in 1999 and killed four people. The group has twice been involved in plots to assassinate the US Ambassador to Lebanon. Between 2005 and 2011, AAA members traveled to Iraq to fight against Coalition forces.

Date listed
2002-11-27

Date reviewed
2021-06-041

Atomwaffen Division

Also known as
AWD, National Socialist Order, NSO.

Description
Founded in the United States in 2013, the Atomwaffen Division (AWD) is an international neo-Nazi terror group, which has since expanded to the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and elsewhere. The group calls for acts of violence against racial, religious, and ethnic groups, and informants, police, and bureaucrats, to prompt the collapse of society. AWD has previously held training camps, also known as hate camps, where its members receive weapons and hand-to-hand combat training. AWD members have also carried out violent acts at public rallies, including the August 2017 rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. In July 2019, the co-leader of AWD, an American citizen, was banned from Canada by the Immigration and Refugee Board after it was determined that he was a member of an organization that has or will engage in terrorist activities.

Date listed
2021-02-03

Date reviewed
Not yet reviewed

Aum Shinrikyo

Also known as
Aum Shinri Kyo, Aum, Aum Supreme Truth, A. I. C. Comprehensive Research Institute, A. I. C. Sogo Kenkyusho and Aleph

Description
Formed in Japan in 1987, Aum Shinrikyo (Aum) is a religious organization with a belief system that mixes various religions – primarily Buddhism – with science fiction and the prophecies of Nostradamus. Aum aimed to control Japan, then the world, and subsequently create a global utopian society. Originally peaceful in nature, the group became increasingly dangerous and violent, seeking to actively bring about Armageddon. In 1994 Aum committed its first sarin attack against Japanese civilians by releasing the nerve agent in Matsumoto, killing seven people and wounding more than a hundred others. In its most infamous attack, Aum released sarin in the Tokyo subway system in 1995, killing a dozen people and wounding thousands more. As of 2016, Aum continues to maintain facilities in Japan and Russia.

Date listed
2002-12-10

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Blood & Honour (B&H)

Also known as
N/A

Description
Blood & Honour (B&H) is an international neo-Nazi network whose ideology is derived from the National Socialist doctrine of Nazi Germany. Through their armed branch, Combat 18 (C18), the group has carried out violent actions, including murders and bombings. B&H was founded in the United Kingdom in 1987 and grew during the 1990s, establishing branches throughout Europe by the end of the decade. B&H attacks have occurred in North America and in several EU-member states. In January 2012, four B&H members in Tampa, Florida, were convicted of the 1998 murder of two homeless men who were killed because the group considered them “inferior.” In February 2012, members of B&H and C18 firebombed a building occupied mostly by Romani families, including children, in Aš, Czech Republic.

Date listed
2019-06-21

Date reviewed
Not yet reviewed

Babbar Khalsa International (BKI)

Also known as
Babbar Khalsa

Description
Babbar Khalsa International (BKI) is a Sikh terrorist entity that aims to establish a fundamentalist independent Sikh state called Khalistan (Land of the Pure) in what is presently the Indian state of Punjab. BKI activities include armed attacks, assassinations, and bombings. BKI has members outside of India in Pakistan, North America, Europe, and Scandinavia.

Date listed
2003-06-18

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Boko Haram

Also known as
Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (People of the Tradition of the Prophet for Preaching and Striving / Group Committed to Propagating the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad)

Description
Boko Haram (BH) is a Salafist jihadist group operating in northern Nigeria whose ultimate objective is to overthrow the Nigerian government and implement Sharia Law. The group desires a political system in Nigeria modeled after how the Taliban ruled in Afghanistan. Its tactics include small arms attacks, the use of improvised explosive devices, suicide bombings, and kidnappings. BH conducted a suicide bomb attack against the United Nations compound in Abuja, Nigeria in August 2011, killing 23 people. In April 2014, BH kidnapped a Canadian nun and two Italian priests in Cameroon. A few days later, in Nigeria, the group kidnapped 276 schoolgirls. In 2015, BH leader Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and BH renamed itself the "Islamic States West Africa Province". However, the Islamic State appointed Abu Musab al-Barnawi as leader of Islamic States West Africa Province, resulting in the formation of two rival factions; one loyal to Shekau operating under the BH banner, and the other (Islamic States West Africa Province) led by Barnawi. During the first nine months of 2016, BH was responsible for nearly 400 deaths in Nigeria, and approximately 850 deaths in 2017. In many of its attacks BH used children, particularly young girls, as suicide bombers.

Date listed
2013-12-24

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Caucasus Emirate

Also known as
Imarat Kavkaz and Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus

Description
The Caucasus Emirate is a Sunni Salafist Islamist extremist network which formed in October 2007. Its goal is to overthrow the secular governments in the North Caucasus republics and establish an Islamic emirate governed under the Salafist interpretation of Sharia Law. The Caucasus Emirate has carried out terrorist activities in Russia and the North Caucasus republics that range from ambushes with small arms, targeted assassinations using snipers, improvised explosive devices, and suicide bombings. Since November 2014, many of the network's leaders have switched their allegiance to the Islamic State. On February 22, 2017, a Caucasus Emirate spokesman called for militants in Chechnya to target Russian infrastructure and military facilities.

Date listed
2013-12-24

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Combat 18 (C18)

Also known as
N/A

Description
Blood & Honour (B&H) is an international neo-Nazi network whose ideology is derived from the National Socialist doctrine of Nazi Germany. Through their armed branch, Combat 18 (C18), the group has carried out violent actions, including murders and bombings. B&H was founded in the United Kingdom in 1987 and grew during the 1990s, establishing branches throughout Europe by the end of the decade. B&H attacks have occurred in North America and in several EU-member states. In January 2012, four B&H members in Tampa, Florida, were convicted of the 1998 murder of two homeless men who were killed because the group considered them “inferior.” In February 2012, members of B&H and C18 firebombed a building occupied mostly by Romani families, including children, in Aš, Czech Republic.

Date listed
2019-06-21

Date reviewed
Not yet reviewed

Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)

Also known as
National Liberation Army and the Army of National Liberation

Description
Founded in 1964, the ELN's principal aim is to "seize power for the people" and establish a revolutionary government. The group believes foreign involvement in Colombia's oil industry violates the country's sovereignty and foreign companies are unfairly exploiting Colombia's natural resources. ELN activities include kidnapping, hijacking, bombing, extortion, and guerrilla warfare. In its attacks, the ELN primarily targets the Colombian oil industry, political events, and political figures. On January 10, 2018, the ELN conducted three bomb attacks against the Cano Limon oil pipeline; a grenade attack on a naval base in Arauca, which injured 2 soldiers; and a sniper attack, which killed a Colombian soldier near the Venezuelan border.

Date listed
2003-04-02

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)

Also known as
Basque Homeland and Liberty, Euzkadi Ta Azkatasuna, Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna, Basque Nation and Liberty, Basque Fatherland and Liberty and Basque Homeland and Freedom.

Description
The Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) was formed in 1959 and is headquartered in the Basque provinces of Spain and France. It has been responsible for attacks on Spanish and French interests domestically and abroad. ETA aims to create an independent Basque state that would contain the six Basque provinces of Spain and France, as well as the Navarra province of Spain. ETA activities include bombings, assassinations and kidnappings. In July 2009, ETA claimed responsibility for the bombing of a police barracks in Spain which wounded at least 40 people, including 6 children. In May 2018, ETA officially dissolved. However, European authorities have continued to pursue criminal charges against former members of ETA. ETA is said to have killed over 800 people and carried out some 1,600 terrorist attacks since its formation.

Date listed
2003-04-02

Date reviewed
2021-06-04

Fatemiyoun Division (FD)

Also known as
Fatemioun Brigade, Fatemioun Military Division, Fatemiyoun, Fatemiyoun Battalion, Fatemiyoun Force, Fatemiyyun, Liwa Fatemiyoun, Liwa al-Fatemiyon, Fatemiyon Brigade, Fatemiyon Division, Fatemiyoun Brigade

Description
The Fatemiyoun Division (FD) is a Hazara Shiite Militia fighting in Syria comprised mainly of Afghan refugees recruited from Iran and Afghanistan. The group is directed by Iran’s Qods Force, which, along with Hizballah also provides support and training. Originally deployed to protect Shia shrines in Syria, in November 2017, the group vowed to continue to fight alongside the “axis of resistance” to annihilate Israel. The FD is also active in parts of Afghanistan where it has fought mostly against anti-Shia Muslim or anti-Iranian groups. On December 24, 2019, Iranian-recruited Afghans affiliated with FD posted a video showing them near the Golan Heights and claiming that they had come to fight the “Zionists.”

Date listed
2019-06-21

Date reviewed
2020-11-25

Front de Libération du Macina

Also known as
FLM, Macina Liberation Front, Massina Liberation Front, Katiba Massina, Massina Brigade, Macina Brigade, Katiba Macina, Katibat Macina, Ansar Dine Macina, Harakat Ansar al-Din Macina Brigade, Ansar al-Din South, Macina Batallion, Macina Liberation Movement, La Force de Libération du Macina, ML Movement, Massina Liberation Movement, Ansar al-Din Macina Brigade, Katibat Macina – Ansar Dine, Ansar al-Din Macina, MLF, MLM.

Description
Emerging in January 2015, Front de Libération du Macina (FLM) is a Mali-based Islamist extremist group. A constituent of Jama’at Nusrat Al-Islam Wal-Muslimin (JNIM), FLM has targeted Malian and international security forces, civilians, and more recently, schools and teachers. The group’s main objective is to liberate the Fulani, mainly-Muslim people scattered across 21 different African countries, from Malian government “oppression.” On November 20, 2015, militants from various groups including FLM carried out a gun attack at the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako, killing over 20 people. More than 170 people were taken hostage during the siege, including three Canadians.

Date listed
2021-02-03

Date reviewed
Not yet reviewed

Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)

Also known as
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC-EP), National Finance Commission (Comisión Nacional de Finanzas) and Coordinadora Nacional Guerrillera Simon Bolivar (CNGSB)

Description
Established in the 1960s, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is Colombia's oldest, largest, and best-equipped leftist insurgency group. FARC is guided by its goal of overthrowing the current government in Colombia and replacing it with a leftist, anti-American regime that would force all United States interests out of Colombia and Latin America. FARC activities include bombings, hijackings, assassinations, and the kidnapping of Colombian officials and Westerners. Both FARC and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) are members of the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordination Board. In 2016, after years of negotiation, the Colombian government signed a peace agreement with the FARC.

Date listed
2003-04-02

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar

Also known as
Gulabudin Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin Khekmatiyar, Gulbuddin Hekmatiar, Gulbuddin Hekmartyar, Gulbudin Hekmetyar, Golboddin Hikmetyar and Gulbuddin Hekmetyar

Description
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the group Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), espouses an extreme Islamist anti-Western ideology with the objective of overthrowing the Afghani administration and creating an Islamic state. Hekmatyar has declared his intention to wage jihad against foreign troops and interests in Afghanistan until all occupation forces are driven out. He has perpetrated indiscriminate attacks against civilians, government officials and foreign officers. In 2006, Hekmatyar pledged allegiance to Al Qaida leader Usama bin Laden and vowed to join Al Qaida's holy war. On May 18, 2016, Afghanistan's government signed a draft peace agreement with HIG. In July 2016, Hekmatyar ordered his followers to fight against the Taliban in support of the Islamic State.

Date listed
2005-05-24

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Faction of the Hezb-e Islami, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)

Also known as
N/A

Description
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's faction of the Hezb-e Islami, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), espouses a radical Islamist anti-Western ideology with the objectives of overthrowing the Karzai administration, eliminating all Western influence in Afghanistan, and creating an Islamic state. Hekmatyar's men were reputed to be the most effective mujahideen group to fight against the Soviet occupation and the most extreme of all Afghan fighters. Drawing support from Pakistan, HIG now has a presence in much of Afghanistan and is an important component of resistance forces in the country. HIG is known to cooperate with Al Qaida and the Taliban, and has a history of engaging in terrorist activities including killings, torture, kidnappings and forcible detainment, and attacking political figures. HIG often targets civilians, journalists, and foreign aid workers. On May 18, 2016, after over two months of negotiations, Afghanistan's government signed a draft peace agreement with the HIG.

Date listed
2006-10-23

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Hamas (Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya) (Islamic Resistance Movement)

Also known as
N/A

Description
Hamas, the Arabic acronym for the group Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya, is a radical Islamist-nationalist terrorist organization that emerged from the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1987. It uses political and violent means to pursue its goal of establishing an Islamic Palestinian state in Israel. Since 1990, Hamas has been responsible for terrorist attacks against both civilian and military targets. Hamas has been one of the primary groups involved in suicide bombings aimed at Israelis since the start of the Al-Aqsa intifada in September 2000. In 2006, Hamas participated in and won Palestinian parliamentary elections, leading to negotiations between the group and the Palestinian Authority over the establishment of a unity government. In 2007, however, Hamas overthrew the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip and seized power of the coastal territory. Although the group's political leadership resides in Damascus, Hamas uses the Gaza Strip as a base for terrorist operations aimed against Israel.

Date listed
2002-11-27

Date reviewed
2021-06-04

Haqqani Network

Also known as
N/A

Description
The Haqqani Network is an Afghan and Pakistani insurgent group described as one of the most powerful and violent organizations in the region. The immediate objective of the Haqqani Network is the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan, and the re-establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan through the overthrow of the Karzai administration. Controlling the security environment in Afghanistan and cultivating the global Jihadist movement are also priorities of the Network. The Haqqani Network poses a significant local threat to Afghan and coalition forces, as well as innocent civilians in its area of operations. The Haqqani Network has been responsible for many of the highest-profile attacks in Afghanistan. According to official American estimates, Haqqani Network operations account for about one-tenth of attacks on coalition troops, and about 15 percent of casualties. The Haqqani Network was the first group to adopt the use of suicide bombers for attacks in Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network uses large vehicle-borne Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), suicide vests, and swarming attacks, which capture headlines and create doubts about the ability of Afghan forces to protect its civilians without North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) support. The Haqqani Network specializes in coordinated attacks. It has carried out a series of tactically sophisticated complex attacks, often directly assaulting coalition facilities.

Date listed
2013-05-09

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Harakat al-Sabireen (HaS)

Also known as
Al-Sabirin Movement for Supporting Palestine, Al-Sabireen Movement for Supporting Palestine, Al-Sabirin, Al-Sabireen, a-Sabrin organization, Al-Sabireen for the Victory of Palestine, HISN, HOSN, The Sabireen Movement, HESN, Movement of Those Who Endure With Patience, Movement of the Patient Ones

Description
Harakat al-Sabireen (HaS) is an Iranian-backed Shia group which has operated in the Gaza Strip since 2014. HaS espouses an ideology which rejects a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine and calls for the destruction of Israel. HaS has fired rockets into Israel, including during the summer of 2014, and targeted Israeli army patrols using explosive devices. Members of HaS have claimed they fight against Israel alongside Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Iran’s Qods Force, assisted by the Palestinian Operations department of Hizballah, has financed and provided media exposure to HaS.

Date listed
2019-06-21

Date reviewed
Not yet reviewed

Harakat ul-Mudjahidin (HuM)

Also known as
Al-Faran, Al-Hadid, Al-Hadith, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Harakat ul-Mujahideen, Harakat al- Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Ansar, Harakat ul-Ansar, Harakat al-Ansar, Harkat-ul-Jehad-e-Islami, Harkat Mujahideen, Harakat-ul-Mujahideen al-Almi, Holy Warriors Movement, Movement of the Mujahideen, Movement of the Helpers, Movement of Islamic Fighters, Al Qanoon, Jamiat ul-Ansar

Description
Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM) is a Pakistan-based radical Kashmiri Islamist organization. It seeks Pakistani rule for the Indian territory of Kashmir and also calls for a war against America and India. To achieve these objectives, HuM employs various methods that include hijacking as well as kidnapping and executing foreigners and Indian government officials. The group has links with Al Qaida, and is also a signatory to the Al Qaida-issued 1998 fatwa (religious decree) against the United States and Israel.

Date listed
2002-11-27

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

HASAM (Harakat Sawa'd Misr)

Also known as
Hassam, The Hasam Movement, Hasm, Hassm, the Hassm Movement, Harikat Souaid Misr, Harakah Sawa'id Misr, the Movement of Egypt's Arms, the Movement of Egypt's Forearms, the Arms of Egypt Movement

Description
HASAM portrays itself as a nationalist movement attempting to overthrow the government of Egypt. HASAM announced its existence on July 16, 2016, when it claimed responsibility for an attack in Tameeya, Egypt, which left 2 policemen dead and 1 injured. Since then, HASAM has primarily targeted the Egyptian security apparatus, which the organization describes as enablers of the regime. In addition to other attacks, HASAM claimed responsibility for the March 26, 2017, bombing in Qalyubia governorate which wounded 5 members of Egypt's security forces; the May 1, 2017, night time attack on an Egyptian police patrol which killed at least 3 policemen; and, the July 20, 2017, shooting attack on a police convoy in which 1 officer was killed and 3 more were wounded.

Date listed
2019-02-11

Date reviewed
Not yet reviewed

Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham

Also known as

Description
Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is an Islamist group in Syria whose purported primary objectives are overthrowing President Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria followed by the creation of an Islamic state under Sharia Law. In July 2016, Jabhat Al-Nursa (JN), an Al Qaida affiliated Sunni militant Islamist group in Syria, changed its name to Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS). Six months later, in January 2017, JFS and four smaller groups issued a statement announcing their dissolution in favour of merging under a single group known as HTS. JN, which is now part of HTS, has claimed responsibility for nearly 600 attacks – such as ambushes, kidnappings, assassinations, Improvised Explosive Device attacks and suicide bombings – in major city centers including Damascus, Aleppo, Hamah, Dara, Homs, Idlib, and Dayr al-Zawr. In March 2017, 2 HTS suicide bombers attacked Damascus, killing at least 74 people, including 8 children. More recently, on December 21, 2019, HTS claimed killing 30 Syrian regime troops in a suicide bombing in Raffa, a town in the southeast of Idlib governorate.

Date listed
2013-11-07

Date reviewed
2020-11-25

Hizballah

Also known as
Hizbullah, Hizbollah, Hezbollah, Hezballah, Hizbullah, The Party of God, Islamic Jihad (Islamic Holy War), Islamic Jihad Organization, Islamic Resistance, Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine, Ansar al-Allah (Followers of God/Partisans of God/God's Helpers), Ansarollah (Followers of God/Partisans of God/God's Helpers), Ansar Allah (Followers of God/Partisans of God/God's Helpers), Al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah (Islamic Resistance), Organization of the Oppressed, Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, Revolutionary Justice Organization, Organization of Right Against Wrong and Followers of the Prophet Muhammed.

Description
One of the most technically capable terrorist groups in the world, Hizballah is a radical Shia group ideologically inspired by the Iranian revolution. Its goals are the liberation of Jerusalem, the destruction of Israel, and, ultimately, the establishment of a revolutionary Shia Islamic state in Lebanon, modelled after Iran. Formed in 1982 in response to Israel's invasion of Lebanon, Hizballah carried out some of the most infamous terror attacks of the Lebanese civil war, such as the suicide bombings of the barracks of United States Marines and French paratroopers in Beirut, as well as the hijacking of TWA Flight 847. While all other Lebanese militias disarmed at the end of Lebanon's civil war in 1990, Hizballah continued to fight, waging a guerilla war against Israeli troops stationed in southern Lebanon. Following Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, Hizballah attacks against Israeli forces continued, concentrated on the disputed Shebaa Farms area. In 2006, Hizballah provoked Israel's invasion of Lebanon by kidnapping two Israeli soldiers and killing 8 others. On January 3, 2018, Hizballah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah announced that the group was working "to obtain all kinds of weapons that would enable it to achieve victory in the next war." In September 2019, Hizballah fired anti-tank missiles into a small farming community along the Lebanese border with Israel.

Date listed
2002-12-10

Date reviewed
2021-06-04

Hizbul Mujahideen

Also known as
HM, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen

Description
Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) was formed in 1989 as a militant Kashmiri liberation group, when an armed insurgency against Indian rule first broke out in the Kashmir valley. The group’s primary goal is to unite the Indian and Pakistan administered parts of Kashmir, which would then join with Pakistan. HM has launched attacks on Indian security forces, politicians, military targets and critical infrastructure within the newly formed territories of Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh. HM’s tactics include using assassinations and armed assault. The group has also abducted and killed police officers, and informants.

Date listed
2021-02-03

Date reviewed
Not yet reviewed

Indian Mujahideen (IM)

Also known as
Indian Mujahedeen; Indian Mujahidin; and Islamic Security Force – IM (ISF–IM)

Description
The IM is a Sunni Islamist militant group, consisting primarily of former members of the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). The IM is best understood as a label for a relatively amorphous, decentralized network that operates through a number of modules across India. The IM's stated goal is to carry out terrorist actions against non-Muslims, for their oppression of Muslims. The group's primary method of attack is multiple coordinated bombings in crowded areas against economic and civilian targets to maximize terror and casualties. The group has also organized training in Pakistan with militant Islamist groups such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, a listed entity under the Criminal Code. The IM were found to have conducted a July 13, 2011 attack in which three explosive devices were detonated consecutively in separate locations in Mumbai, Maharashtra. At least 22 people were killed and 131 others wounded. As of 2018, media reports suggest that IM has been trying to revive itself following a series of arrests of its key operatives, internal disagreement between leaders, and defections.

Date listed
2016-12-28

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

International Relief Fund for the Afflicted and Needy - Canada (IRFAN – CANADA)

Also known as
International Relief Fund for the Afflicted and Needy, International Relief Fund for the Afflicted and Needy (Canada), IRFAN, IRFAN – Canada, IRFAN Society

Description
The International Relief Fund for the Afflicted and Needy-Canada (IRFAN-Canada) is a not for profit organization operating in Canada. Between 2005 and 2009, IRFAN-Canada transferred approximately $14.6 million worth of resources to various organizations with links to Hamas.

Date listed
2014-04-24

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF)

Also known as
N/A

Description
The International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF) was founded in 1984 in the United Kingdom as an international branch of the All India Sikh Students' Federation (AISSF), with centres in several countries, including Canada. The ISYF is a Sikh organization whose aim is to promote Sikh philosophy and the establishment of an independent Sikh nation called Khalistan. Since 1984, its members have been engaged in terrorist attacks, assassinations and bombings primarily against Indian political figures, but also against moderate members of the Sikh community. The ISYF collaborates and/or associates with a number of Sikh terrorist organizations, including Babbar Khalsa International.

Date listed
2003-06-18

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

Also known as
O'zbekiston Islomiy Harakati, Harakat ul-Islamiyyah, Islamic Movement of Turkestan, Islamic Party of Turkestan (IPT) and IMU-IPT

Description
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is a terrorist organization whose primary goal is to overthrow the government of Uzbekistan. The IMU has employed kidnapping, armed attacks against government installations, cross-border incursions, and coordinated efforts with other terrorist groups, such as Al Qaida. The United Nations reported in January 2017 that IMU continues to fight in Northern Afghanistan, with some splinter groups attempting to spread into other Central Asian states. Other reports from 2017 indicate that one dissident faction continues to operate in Afghanistan and Syria. The IMU has attacked Westerners and has declared its intentions to continue to work with groups with "similar objectives".

Date listed
2003-04-02

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Qods Force

Also known as
Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Islami (Pasdaran), Sepah-e Qods, Qods/Quds, al Quds, al Quds Force, Qods/Quds Force, Qods Corps, Jerusalem Corps, Jerusalem Force and Qods Force.

Description
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Qods Force is the clandestine branch of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) responsible for extraterritorial operations, and for exporting the Iranian Revolution through activities such as facilitating terrorist operations. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Qods Force provides arms, funding and paramilitary training to extremist groups, including the Taliban, Lebanese Hizballah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC).

Date listed
2012-12-17

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Islamic State

Also known as

Description
The Islamic State is a Sunni jihadist group that seeks to sow civil unrest in Iraq and the Levant with the aim of establishing a single, transnational Islamic state based on Sharia Law, replacing the Iraqi and Syrian governments. The group was originally created in Jordan in the early 1990s under the name Bayat al Imam. The group associated with Al Qaida Core's senior leadership in 1999 and fought alongside Al Qaida Core and the Taliban during the US strikes in Afghanistan in late 2001. The group then transferred to Iraq in anticipation of the US led invasion, and, in October 2004, formally renamed itself "Al Qaida in Iraq" (AQI). The group has also operated under the name of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). In 2013, the group renamed itself the "Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL). In June 2014, the group renamed itself "Islamic State". The Islamic State's tactics include suicide attacks using vehicles and improvised explosive devices, armed attacks, hostage takings, and video-taped beheadings. In November 2015, IS claimed responsibility for coordinated attacks in six Paris locations that killed 120 and injured 200. Four months later, in March 2016, IS claimed responsibility for two bomb explosions at the Brussels Airport and another bomb explosion at the Maelbeek metro station near the offices of the European Union; these attacks killed 31 people and injured 340. IS also claimed responsibility for the May 22, 2017 suicide bombing during a concert at the Manchester Arena in the United Kingdom, which killed at least 22 people and injured hundreds more. In June and August 2017, IS claimed responsibility for three vehicular ramming attacks in the UK and Spain. These attacks killed at least 27 people, including 2 Canadians.

Date listed
2012-08-20

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Islamic State – Bangladesh

Also known as
Daesh – Bangladesh

Description
Islamic State – Bangladesh is a violent extremist group that was formed in August 2014, when a group of unidentified Bangladeshi nationals pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and vowed to organize Bengali Muslims under the leadership of IS Chief Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi. The group’s primary goal is uniting the world under one Muslim caliphate. To achieve this, the group encourages followers in Bangladesh to target the country’s political leaders, parliamentarians and members of the security forces and law enforcement, as well as non-Muslims. The group was thought to have been led by a now deceased Canadian-Bangladeshi, who was one of two masterminds of the 2016 attack on the Holey Artisan café in Dhaka resulting in the deaths of twenty two people, mostly foreigners.

Date listed
2021-02-03

Date reviewed
Not yet reviewed

Islamic State – Democratic Republic of the Congo

Also known as
IS-DRC, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – Democratic Republic of the Congo, ISIS-DRC, Daesh – Democratic Republic of the Congo, Allied Democratic Forces, ADF, Madina at Tauheed Wau Mujahedeen, City of Monotheism and Holy Warriors, Islamic State Central Africa Province, ISCAP, Wilayat Central Africa, Wilayah Central Africa, Wilayah Central Africa Media Office, Wilayat Wasat Ifriqiyah, ISIS-Central Africa

Description
In April 2019, the Islamic State (IS) announced the creation of Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP). ISCAP is composed of two separate, geographically distinct insurgencies—one in northern Mozambique and one in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) being conducted by Islamic State – Democratic Republic of the Congo (IS-DRC). In July 2019, IS released a video of Musa Baluku, the leader of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an Islamist-affiliated rebel group based in DRC, pledging allegiance to the leader of IS. Several members of the ADF disagreed with the pledge and split away from the larger group that year. Since the pledge, many of the ADF’s activities have been claimed by IS under the regional banner of ISCAP. IS-DRC has been responsible for attacks in eastern DRC against civilians and military targets. On May 13, 2020, IS issued two communiqués, the first claiming that fighters captured and killed three Congolese soldiers in North Kivu Province, DRC. The second claimed that fighters shot and killed 10 people after opening fire on a crowd of Christians in Iringite, a city near Beni, DRC. Both attacks were confirmed by local media as perpetrated by the ADF. On October 20, 2020, the ADF attacked Kangbayi central prison in Beni, DRC, and freed over 1,300 prisoners. Both the ADF and IS claimed responsibility for the attack.

Date listed
2021-06-25

Date reviewed
Not yet reviewed

Islamic State East Asia

Also known as
ISEA, Daesh’s East Asia Province, Islamic State-Philippines, Ansharul Khilafah Philippines, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters – Bungos, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters – Abubakar, Jama’atu al-Muhajirin wal Ansar fil Filibin, Dawlah Islamiyah, Islamic State Lanao, Maute Group, Islamic State Ranao, Dawlatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Masrik, Islamic State Sunrise Province.

Description
Islamic State East Asia (ISEA) is a violent extremist group, officially recognized by the Islamic State as an affiliate. ISEA's primary objective is the establishment of an Islamic State under Shariah law in the Philippines and is comprised of a number of violent extremist organisations who have pledged allegiance to Daesh and conducted violent acts to achieve their goals, including beheadings that mimic those conducted by Daesh. These include the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), a terrorist entity that is linked to a number of high-profile kidnappings and executions, including the beheadings of two Canadians in 2016. In May 2017, ISEA conducted a large-scale attack on Marawi City, Philippines, killing a substantial number of security forces and civilians. The group laid siege to the city for five months, during which a number of Christian hostages were executed. More recently, on January 27, 2019, ISEA claimed responsibility for two bombs that were detonated at the Jolo Catholic cathedral, killing 21 and wounding at least 100.

Date listed
2021-02-03

Date reviewed
Not yet reviewed

Islamic State in the Greater Sahara

Also known as
ISGS, Daesh in the Greater Sahara, ISIS in the Greater Sahara, Islamic State of the Greater Sahel, ISIS in the Greater Sahel, ISIS in the Islamic Sahel, ISIS-GS.

Description
Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) pledged its allegiance to the Islamic State in May 2015. The group operates and has carried out attacks in the Mali-Niger-Burkina Faso tri-border area. ISGS’s primary objective is the replacement of regional governments with an Islamic State and to destabilize the Sahel. ISGS regularly targets regional security and military forces, including: Tuareg militias, French soldiers, Niger Gendarmerie forces, Burkina Faso security services, and Malian soldiers. The group claimed responsibility for the killing of a Canadian geologist in January 2019 and is suspected of attacking a Canadian mining company convoy the same year.

Date listed
2021-02-03

Date reviewed
Not yet reviewed

Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP)

Also known as
Also known as: Islamic State in the Khorasan Province, Islamic State Khorasan, Islamic State – Khorasan, IS Khorasan, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan (ISIL-K), Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – Khorasan (ISIS-K), Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham – Khorasan (ISIS-K), Wilayat Khorasan, Daesh Khorasan, ISIL's South Asia Branch, ISIS Wilayat Khorasan, Islamic State's Khorasan Province , South Asian chapter of ISIL, ISIL Khorasan (ISIL-K), Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State, Islamic State Wilayat Khorasan (ISWK), Khorasan branch of ISIS.

Description
Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP) is a violent Sunni extremist group, officially recognized by the Islamic State (IS) as an affiliate based in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. The objective of ISKP is to establish the "wilayat" (province) of Khorasan as part of the global IS caliphate. Since IS announced the establishment of ISKP in January 2015, the group has carried out suicide bombings, small arms attacks, and kidnappings against civilians, aid organizations and security forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan. ISKP has demonstrated its ability to carry out high profile attacks, including against Western interests. ISKP claimed responsibility for the June 2016 bomb attack in Kabul that targeted a bus carrying security guards contracted by the Canadian Embassy, which killed at least 14 people; the October 2016 attack on a police training center in Quetta that killed at least 59 people and injured 100; and, the May 2017 attack on a NATO convoy in Kabul that killed 8 civilians and injured 25. The group also claimed responsibility for the January 24, 2018, attack in Jalalabad which targeted the international charity "Save the Children" that killed at least 6 people and injured 27. In November 2019, ISKP published photos of its fighters pledging allegiance to the new IS leader and "Caliph," Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi.

Date listed
2018-05-23

Date reviewed
2020-11-25

Islamic State in Libya

Also known as
Daesh in Libya, IS-Libya, Islamic State – Libya, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Libya, Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham – Libya, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – Libya, Wilayat Barqa, Wilayat Barqah, Wilayat Fezzan, Wilayat Tripolitania, Wilayat Tarablus, Wilayat al-Tarabulus, Tripoli Province, Barqa Province, Barqah Province, Fezzan Province.

Description
Islamic State in Libya (IS-Libya) is a violent extremist group, formed by Libyan foreign fighters, who had fought as part of the Daesh-affiliated Battar Brigade, and returned to Libya from Syria. The group follows an extreme interpretation of Islam that is anti-Western and promotes sectarian violence. IS-Libya aims to remove the United Nations-backed transitional Government of National Accord in Libya. The group targets civilians and police officers, and has used suicide bombings to advance its objectives. In May 2018, suicide bombers stormed Libya’s electoral commission in Tripoli, killing at least a dozen people in an attack. In September 2018, the Islamic State claimed responsibility for an attack on the headquarters of Libya’s main oil company National Oil Corp, opening fire on staff and killing two employees.

Date listed
2021-02-03

Date reviewed
Not yet reviewed

Islamic State – Sinai Province (ISSP)

Also known as
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis; Ansar Jerusalem; Islamic State – Sinai State

Description
Islamic State – Sinai Province (ISSP), formerly known as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, is a Sunni Salafist Islamist extremist group based in the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt, which first appeared in 2011. The primary objective of the group is the formation of an Islamic state in Egypt under Sharia Law. The primary targets of ISSP's violence include the Egyptian military and security services, Israeli interests, and Israeli economic interests. They have carried out repeated attacks against security forces, politicians, and civilians in Egypt using small arms, improvised explosive devices, vehicle-born improvised explosive devices, and surface-to-air missiles. In November 2014, ISSP pledged its allegiance to the Islamic State (IS), and expanded its targets to include tourist sites, Western interests, Western embassies, and the media. In August 2015, ISSP claimed to have beheaded a Croatian national kidnapped and taken hostage in Cairo in July. Two months later, ISSP claimed responsibility for downing Russian airliner KGL9268 over the Sinai through an improvised explosive device (IED) killing all 224 passengers aboard. ISSP continues to conduct cross-border attacks against Israel, including firing several rockets in February, April, and October 2017.

Date listed
2015-04-07

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Islamic State West Africa Province

Also known as
ISWAP, Daesh’s West Africa Province, ISIS-West Africa, ISIS West Africa, ISIS West Africa Province, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria West Africa Province, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-West Africa, West Africa Province, Wilayat Gharb Afriqiyya, Wilayat Gharb Afriqiyah, Islamic State in West Africa, ISIS-WA, ISIL-WA.

Description
Islamic State West Africa Province was formed in March 2015. The group’s primary objective is to replace the Nigerian Government and establish an Islamic state with a strict interpretation of Sharia Law. Islamic State West Africa Province is the largest Daesh group in Africa with approximately 3,500 – 5,000 fighters and has access to military-grade small-arms and heavy weapons. The group focuses its attacks on regional security and military targets associated with all five Multinational Joint Task Force countries (Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Benin), Western, Christian, and secular targets, and has kidnapped and executed aid workers. On December 25, 2019, Islamic State West Africa Province fighters attacked Christians in Nigeria’s Borno State, and killed 8 people with machine gun fire, and captured two others. A day later, also in Borno state, a video was released of the group’s fighters executing 11 people identified as Christians.

Date listed
2021-02-03

Date reviewed
Not yet reviewed

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)

Also known as
Jaish-i-Mohammed (Mohammad, Muhammad, Muhammed), Jaish-e-Mohammad (Muhammed), Jaish-e-Mohammad Mujahideen E-Tanzeem, Jeish-e-Mahammed, Army of Mohammed, Mohammed's Army, Tehrik Ul-Furqaan, National Movement for the Restoration of Pakistani Sovereignty and Army of the Prophet.

Description
Founded in early 2000, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) is an Islamist extremist group based in Pakistan. Its objectives are to absorb the Indian-administered areas of Jammu and Kashmir into Pakistan and ultimately establish an Islamist state in the country. JeM is committed to using indiscriminate terror tactics to achieve its objectives, including targeting foreigners and political representatives of foreign states. Between 2016 and 2018, JeM has carried out at least four attacks targeting police and military camps. These attacks killed at least 23 people, including soldiers, policemen, and civilians. The purpose of some of these attacks was to target family quarters, hospitals, and to take women and children hostage. In November 2020, four JeM affiliated militants attacked security forces at a checkpoint in the Nagrota area of Jammu, Jammu and Kashmir. Two officers were injured and a large cache of firearms, ammunition, and explosives were seized by security forces.  

Date listed
2002-11-27

Date reviewed
2021-06-04

Jama’at Nusrat Al-Islam Wal-Muslimin

Also known as
JNIM, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin, Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen, Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin, Jama’ah Nusrah al-Islam wal-Muslimin, Jamaat Nosrat al-Islam wal-Mouslimin, Jama’a Nusrah al-Islam wa al-Muslimin, Islam and Muslims’ Support Group, Group for Support of Islam and Muslims, Group to Support Islam and Muslims, Group of Support for Islam and All Muslims, Group for Supporting Islam and Muslims, Groupe de soutien à l’islam et aux musulmans, Union for Supporting Islam and Muslims, NIM, GSIM, GNIM, Rassemblement pour la victoire de l’islam et des fidèles, RVIF.

Description
Jama’at Nusrat Al-Islam Wal-Muslimin (JNIM) is a Mali-based violent extremist group formed in March 2017, through the merging of four Al Qaida-aligned groups: Ansar Dine, the Front de Liberation du Macina, Al Qaida in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM)’s Sahara branch, and Al-Murabitoun. The group’s main goals are to implement Sharia law across the Sahara region and expel foreign influence. JNIM is an official affiliate of Al Qaida in Mali and mainly targets regional, French, and United Nations (UN) forces. It also targets locations frequented by foreigners, including hotels and restaurants, and holds foreigners hostage for ransom. JNIM’s tactics include improvised explosive devices (IED), vehicle-borne IEDs, suicide bombings, rocket and mortar attacks, and complex small arms attacks. In November 2018, JNIM claimed a suicide attack against a UN base in Gao, and specifically identified Canadian, British, and German forces as being among the “Crusader invader forces.” JNIM subsequently released a second statement identifying the United Nations Mine Action Service as its intended target. JNIM is also suspected of carrying out an August 2017 attack on a restaurant in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, in which two Canadians were among at least 19 people killed.

Date listed
2021-02-03

Date reviewed
Not yet reviewed

James Mason

Also known as
James Nolan Mason

Description
James Nolan Mason is a life-long American neo-Nazi born on July 25, 1952. He has been an active neo-Nazi since he was 14 years old, when he joined the youth group of the American Nazi Party in 1966. Mason is responsible for publishing a series of newsletters in the 1980s, which promoted the idea of lone actors conducting terrorist attacks against the United States government in order to bring about the collapse of society and a race war. Mason’s collective works, published as a book called Siege , have served as the ideological grounding for neo-Nazi groups such as Atomwaffen Division (AWD), which is a listed terrorist entity in Canada, and serves as the backbone for the AWD’s worldview and training program. Mason has also provided tactical direction on how to operate a terrorist group and has met with members of AWD, where he coached them on propagandizing murder and genocide. AWD has used Mason to speak on their behalf by releasing audio recordings of him reading the group’s messaging. Mason and Siege have also been cited as the ideological foundation of Feuerkrieg Division and Sonnenkrieg Division, groups that have been proscribed as terrorist entities in the United Kingdom.

Date listed
2021-06-25

Date reviewed
Not yet reviewed

Jaysh Al-Muhajirin Wal-Ansar (JMA)

Also known as
Jaish al-Muhajireen wal Ansar, Jaysh al-Muhajireen wa'l-Ansar, Army of Migrants and Supporters, Army of the Emigrants and Helpers, Muhajireen Brigade, Mujahideen Army.

Description
JMA is a jihadist militant group operating primarily in the Aleppo area of northern Syria. The goal of JMA is to topple Syrian president Bashar al-Assad's government. JMA is led by Chechans from Russia's North Caucasus, and the group's membership consists of approximately 1000 fighters, most of them foreign. JMA has taken part in joint operations with other jihadist groups in Syria such as the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra. JMA's tactics include the use of large suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, ground assaults, hostage taking and kidnapping, including foreign nationals and Syrian civilians loyal to Assad.

Date listed
2014-10-30

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Jemaah Islamiyyah (JI)

Also known as
Jemaa Islamiyah, Jema'a Islamiyya, Jema'a Islamiyyah, Jema'ah Islamiyah, Jema'ah Islamiyyah, Jemaa Islamiya, Jemaa Islamiyya, Jemaah Islamiyya, Jemaa Islamiyyah, Jemaah Islamiah, Jemaah Islamiyah, Jemaah Islamiyyah, Jemaah Islamiya, Jamaah Islamiyah, Jamaa Islamiya, Jemaah Islam, Jemahh Islamiyah, Jama'ah Islamiyah, Al-Jama'ah Al Islamiyyah, Islamic Group and Islamic Community

Description
Jemaah Islamiyyah (JI) has its roots in Darul Islam, a violent radical movement that advocated the establishment of Islamic law in Indonesia. JI subscribes to a Salafist interpretation of Islam and aims to establish an Islamic caliphate spanning Indonesia, Malaysia, southern Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, and the southern Philippines. JI has had cells throughout much of Southeast Asia and targets what it sees as enemies of Islam. JI has been responsible for a series of bank robberies, hijackings, and several major bombings of civilian targets, such as the 2002 attack on a night club in Bali, which killed 202 people and injured 500 others, including Canadians citizens.

Date listed
2003-04-02

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Kahane Chai (Kach)

Also known as
Meir's Youth, No'ar Meir Repression of Traitors, State of Yehuda, Sword of David, Dikuy Bogdim, DOV, Judea Police, Kahane Lives, Kfar Tapuah Fund, State of Judea, Judean Legion, Judean Voice, Qomemiyut Movement, Way of the Torah and Yeshiva of the Jewish Idea.

Description
Kahane Chai (Kach) is a marginal, extremist Jewish entity whose goal is the restoration of the biblical state of Israel, replacing democracy with theocracy. Kahane Chai (Kach) advocates expelling Arabs from Israel, expanding Israel's boundaries to include the occupied territories and parts of Jordan, and the strict implementation of Jewish law in Israel. Kahane Chai (Kach) has openly espoused violence against Arabs and the Israeli government as a viable method for establishing a religiously homogenous state. Its activities have included threats to government officials and infrastructure, grenade attacks, armed violence, and bombings.

Date listed
2005-05-24

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)

Also known as
Kurdistan Workers Party, Partya Karkeren Kurdistan, Kurdistan Labor Party, Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress, KADEK, Kurdistan People's Congress, Kurdistan Halk Kongresi (KHK), People's Congress of Kurdistan, Kongra-Gel

Description
Formally established in Turkey in 1978 by Abdullah Ocalan, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK / KADEK) is a Kurdish political party whose main goal is the creation of an independent Kurdish state in southeast Turkey and in northern Iraq, a region that is part of the traditional territory of the Kurdish people. To reach its goal, the PKK / KADEK has led a campaign of guerrilla warfare and terrorism, especially in Turkey and in northern Iraq. Its activities include attacking the Turkish military, diplomats and Turkish businesses at home and in some western European cities. It has also been known to bomb resorts and kidnap tourists in an attempt to destabilize tourism in Turkey. On April 11, 2017, the PKK bombed a police compound in Diyarbakir, Turkey, resulting in the death of 3 people, including 1 police officer.

Date listed
2002-12-10

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ)

Also known as
Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Jhangvie, Laskar-e-Jhangvi, Lashkare Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Jhangwi, Lashkar-i-Jhangwi, Jhangvi Army, Lashkar-e Jhangvi, Lashkar Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Jhanvi (LeJ), Lashkar-i-Jangvi, Lashkar e Jhangvi, Lashkar Jangvi, Laskar e Jahangvi.

Description
As a radical Islamist group reportedly linked to Al Qaida, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ) aims to establish an Islamist Sunni state in Pakistan based on Sharia Law – through the use of violence if necessary – and to have all Shiites declared non-believers. It is reputed as being one of the most violent Islamist extremist organizations in Pakistan. Responsible for killing hundreds of Shiites since its formation in 1996, LJ was behind some of the worst incidents of sectarian violence in Pakistan's history. In October 2015, for example, a group of LJ members conducted a suicide attack at a Shiite mosque in Bolan, Baluchistan, killing at least 11 people and wounding another 13. More recently, in June 2017, LJ claimed responsibility for a double suicide bombing at a crowded market in Parachinar, Pakistan, which killed at least 67 people and wounded over 200 others.

Date listed
2003-06-18

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)

Also known as
Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) (Society for Preaching), al-Anfal Trust, Tehrik-e-Hurmate-e-Rasool, al Mansoorian (The Victorious), Army of the Pure, Paasban-e-Kashmir (Kashmir Brigade), Paasban-i-Ahle-Hadith (Ahle-Hadith Brigade), Falah-i-Insaniat Foundation (FIF), Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Lashkar-i-Toiba (LiT), Lashkar-i-Taiba (Holy Regiment), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) (Army of the Righteous), Lashkar-e-Taibyya, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (Army of the Pure and Righteous), Lashkar-e-Taiba (Righteous Army), Lashkar-Taiba (Army of the Good), Lashkar e Toiba, Lashkar e Taiba, Lashkar-E-Tayyaba, Lashkar e Tayyiba

Description
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) is a Pakistan-based, radical organization established in the late 1980s that operates in the Indian states of Kashmir and Jammu. Its overall objective is threefold: to force the accession of Indian administered Kashmir to Pakistan; and to create two Islamist-run states, in the North and in the South of India. LeT's activities include suicide bombings and armed attacks on civilians, government officials and the Indian security forces. The group is also allegedly linked to Al Qaida. LeT's most infamous operation was the 60-hour terror attack in Mumbai on November 26-28, 2008. The LeT has targeted security personnel such as in the December 2014 attack at a Mohara artillery camp that killed 8 army soldiers, 3 policemen and 6 militants, and the February 2016 attack on a police convoy that killed 2 police officers and injured 10 others. On February 6, 2018, LeT militants attacked a hospital in Srinager to free their jailed commander, Naveed Jat, killing 2 policemen.

Date listed
2003-06-18

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

Also known as
The Tamil Tigers, the Eellalan Force, the Ellalan Force, the Tiger Movement, the Sangilian Force, the Air Tigers, the Black Tigers (Karum Puligal), the Sea Tigers, the Tiger Organization Security Intelligence Service (TOSIS) and the Women's Combat Force of Liberation Tigers (WCFLT).

Description
Founded in 1976, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is a Sri Lankan-based terrorist organization that seeks the creation of an independent homeland called "Tamil Eelam" for Sri Lanka's ethnic Tamil minority. Over the years, the LTTE has waged a violent secessionist campaign with the help of ground, air, and naval forces, as well as a dedicated suicide bomber wing. LTTE tactics have included full military operations, terror attacks against civilian centres, and political assassinations, such as the successful assassinations of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi and Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa. The LTTE has also had an extensive network of fundraisers, political and propaganda officers, and arms procurers operating in Sri Lanka and within the Tamil diaspora. Although the LTTE was militarily defeated in May 2009, subversion, destabilization, and fundraising continue, particularly in the diaspora.

Date listed
2006-04-08

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA)

Also known as
MOJWA, Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest, MUJAO, Jamat Tawhid wal Jihad fi Garbi Afriqqiya and Jamaat Tawhid Wal Jihad Fi Garbi Ifriqiya.

Description
The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa is a splinter group of al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. Formed in 2011, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) seeks to spread jihad across West Africa and establish a strict form of Sharia Law. The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa has carried out terrorist activities including kidnappings, small arms attacks, improvised explosive devices attacks, and suicide bombings. On May 23, 2013, MOJWA and al'Muwaqi'un Bil-Dima (MBD) launched twin suicide attacks against a Nigerien army base and a French uranium mine in Niger, killing 25 people. MOJWA merged with MBD to form Al-Murabitoun, in August 2013.

Date listed
2014-06-02

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)

Also known as
PLF-Abu Abbas Faction, Front for the Liberation of Palestine (FLP)

Description
The Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) is a small, armed splinter group allied to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Its objective is the destruction of the State of Israel and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. First founded in 1961 by Ahmad Jibril, the group operates primarily in Europe, Israel, Lebanon and other areas in the Middle East. During its most active period, it is known to have conducted several high-profile attacks, including the October 1985 hijacking of the Italian cruise ship, Achille Lauro.

Date listed
2003-11-13

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

Also known as
Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami fi Filistin, Saraya Al-Quds (The Jerusalem Brigades), Al-Quds Brigades, Islamic Jihad, Palestine Islamic Jihad-Shaqaqi Faction, Palestinian Islamic Jihad-Shaqaqi, PIJ-Shaqaqi Faction, PIJ-Shallah Faction, Islamic Jihad of Palestine, Islamic Jihad in Palestine, Abu Ghunaym Squad of the Hizballah Bayt Al-Maqdis, Al-Quds Squads, Al-Awdah Brigades, Islamic Jihad Palestine (IJP), Islamic Jihad – Palestine Faction and Islamic Holy War

Description
Founded in the late 1970s, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is one of the most violent Palestinian terrorist groups. The PIJ maintains that armed struggle by the Palestinian people, in tandem with active support from the Arab and Muslim worlds, is the only viable strategy for achieving its objectives - the destruction of Israel and the complete liberation of Palestine. The PIJ was among the first to use suicide bomb attacks against Israel. In 1995, two PIJ suicide bombers executed a coordinated attack at a bus stop in Beit Lid, killing 19 people and wounding 61. PIJ claimed responsibility for the October 3, 2015, knife attack in Jerusalem which killed 2 Israeli men and wounded the wife and child of one of the deceased. On February 23, 2020, rockets were fired toward southern Israel after Israel said it had killed a Palestinian militant who tried to place a bomb along the Israel-Gaza barrier fence. PIJ launched several rockets at Israel by the time the ceasefire was announced.

Date listed
2002-11-27

Date reviewed
2021-06-04

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC)

Also known as
Al-Jibha Sha'biya lil-Tahrir Filistin-al-Qadiya al-Ama

Description
Founded in 1968, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC) is an Islamist Communist group committed to the establishment of a Palestinian state and the destruction of Israel. The group is opposed to any negotiation with Israel and believes solely in a military solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It was the first Palestinian group to use suicide squads: in 1974, three members attacked Qiryat Shemona and killed 18 people before dying in a battle with Israeli soldiers. The PFLP-GC has used barometric bombs to blow up aircraft, parcel-explosives sent through the mail as well as motorized hang-gliders in a guerilla raid into Israel. During the 1990s, the PFLP-GC limited its activities to training and equipping other terrorist groups, such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In December 2015, PFLP-GC claimed responsibility for the firing of three rockets on Northern Israel in retaliation for the assassination of a Hizballah member in Syria.

Date listed
2003-11-13

Date reviewed
2021-06-04

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

Also known as
Halhul Gang, Halhul Squad, Palestinian Popular Resistance Forces, PPRF, Red Eagle Gang, Red Eagle Group, Red Eagles, Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, Al-Jibha al-Sha'biya lil-Tahrir Filistin

Description
Formed in 1967, the goals of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) are the destruction of the State of Israel and the establishment of a communist government in Palestine. During the 1970s, the group took part in some of the boldest terrorist attacks of the period, such as hijacking three civilian airliners in one day and storming the Vienna headquarters of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). In 2000, the PFLP turned increasingly to the use of suicide bombers, guerilla tactics, car bombings, and mortar strikes. The PFLP was also responsible for the first assassination of a cabinet minister in Israel's history, killing Tourism Minister Rehavam Zeevi in 2001. In 2014, the PFLP claimed responsibility for a November gun and knife attack at an Orthodox Jewish synagogue in West Jerusalem that killed 6 people. On June 16, 2017, two coordinated attacks targeting Israeli police officers were carried out near the Damascus Gate of Jerusalem's walled old city. In September 2019, the Israeli security forces arrested four PFLP members allegedly responsible for remotely detonating an improvised explosive device in the West Bank that killed an Israeli teenager and seriously wounded two family members.

Date listed
2003-11-13

Date reviewed
2021-06-04

Proud Boys

Also known as
N/A

Description
The Proud Boys is a neo-fascist organization that engages in political violence and was formed in 2016. Members of the group espouse misogynistic, Islamophobic, anti-Semitic, anti-immigrant, and/or white supremacist ideologies and associate with white supremacist groups. The Proud Boys consists of semi-autonomous chapters located in the United States (U.S.), Canada, and internationally. The group and its members have openly encouraged, planned, and conducted violent activities against those they perceive to be opposed to their ideology and political beliefs. The group regularly attends Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests as counter-protesters, often engaging in violence targeting BLM supporters. On January 6, 2021, the Proud Boys played a pivotal role in the insurrection at the U.S. Capitol. Leaders of the group planned their participation by setting out objectives, issuing instructions, and directing members during the insurrection. The leader of the Proud Boys was arrested two days before the insurrection as part of a stated effort by U.S. law enforcement to apprehend individuals who were planning to travel to the D.C. area with intentions to cause violence.

Date listed
2021-02-03

Date reviewed
Not yet reviewed

Russian Imperial Movement

Also known as
RIM, Russkoie Imperskoe Dvizhenie, Russkoe Imperskoye Dvizheniye, RID, Imperial Legion, Russian Imperial Legion, RIL, Saint Petersburg Imperial Legion.

Description
The Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) is a nationalist group based in Russia that seeks to create a mono-ethnic state led by a Russian autocratic monarchy. The group is best known for having members and sympathizers linked to violent activity abroad and seeks to build ties to neo-Nazi organizations in Europe and the United States to offer them paramilitary training and bomb making instructions. In 2015, RIM co-founded the World National Conservative Movement (WNCM), a transnational movement ideologically aligned against the Western principles of ‘liberalism, multiculturalism and tolerance’ according to its own manifesto. RIM leaders intended the WNCM to facilitate the sharing of tactical skills across peer organizations and promote their own paramilitary training program. Furthermore, RIM has donated money to foreign neo-Nazi and white supremacist groups associated with the WNCM and provided training to members who have carried out bomb plots in their own countries. In 2016, RIM provided training to two Swedes who then bombed a bookstore-café, a refugee shelter, and a campground that housed asylum seekers. RIM’s paramilitary faction has also been present in conflicts in Ukraine, Syria, and Libya.

Date listed
2021-02-03

Date reviewed
Not yet reviewed

Sendero Luminoso (SL)

Also known as
Shining Path, Partido Comunista del Peru en el Sendero Luminoso de Jose Carlos Mariategui, Communist Party of Peru on the Shining Path of Jose Carlos Mariategui, Partido Comunista del Peru, Communist Party of Peru, The Communist Party of Peru by the Shining Path of Jose Carlos Mariategui and Marxism, Leninism, Maoism and the Thoughts of Chairman Gonzalo, Revolutionary Student Front for the Shining Path of Mariategui, Communist Party of Peru - By Way of the Shining Path of Mariategui, PCP - por el Sendero Luminoso de Mariategui, PCP and PCP-SL

Description
Established in 1980, Sendero Luminoso (SL) is a splinter group of the Communist Party of Peru. Its objective is to destroy existing Peruvian institutions and replace them with a communist peasant revolutionary regime which would eliminate foreign influence from the country. SL's area of operations is limited to Peru, with most of its activities in rural areas, but some of its attacks have taken place in the capital, Lima. Its tactics include indiscriminate bombing campaigns, political assassinations, as well as armed attacks against civilians and foreign interests in Peru. In March 2017, suspected SL snipers attacked a police convey in Cumumpiari, killing 3 officers. More recently, in September 2017, 3 additional officers were killed in an SL ambush.

Date listed
2003-02-12

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Taliban

Also known as
Afghan Taliban, Tahreek-i-Islami-i-Taliban Afghanistan, Movement of Islamic Students, The Taleban, the Islamic Movement of the Taliban (De Talebano Islami Ghurdzang or Tehrik) and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (De Afghanistan Islami Emarat)

Description
The Taliban is an Islamic fundamentalist political movement in Afghanistan. The Taliban's main objectives are the removal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan, and the restoration of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan through the overthrow of the current government. The top leadership structure in the Taliban is the Rahbari Shura (leadership council), better known as the Quetta Shura after the Pakistani city in which it is currently based. Beneath the Rahbari Shura are the regional military shuras for four major geographical areas of operations in Afghanistan (Quetta, Peshawar, Miramshah, and Gerdi Jangal). The Taliban uses terrorist tactics, including the extensive use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and suicide attacks, to further its political objectives and is known to attack civilian targets, government compounds, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)/Afghan bases, military targets in built-up urban areas, as well as infrastructure projects. In 2011, the Taliban was responsible for the majority of civilian casualties in Afghanistan and have been known to carry out a number of attacks on girls' schools in particular. More recently, on January 27, 2018, the Taliban claimed responsibility for an attack in Kabul which utilized an ambulance as a suicide vehicle-borne IED to kill at least 95 people and wound more than 150.

Date listed
2013-05-09

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

Also known as
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Tehrik-I-Taliban Pakistan, Tehrik-e-Taliban, Pakistani Taliban, Tehreek-e-Taliban, Tehrik Taliban-I-Pakistan, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan.

Description
The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was founded in December 2007 as an umbrella organization for pro-Taliban groups operating mostly in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly North West Frontier Province), Pakistan. It was led, first, by militant commander Baitullah Mehsud and, following his death, by Hakimullah Mehsud. The TTP aims to create a Taliban-style Islamic emirate under Sharia Law, beginning in Pakistan's tribal areas and later extending to include Muslims elsewhere. The TTP strives to untie pro-Taliban groups in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, to assist the Afghan Taliban in their campaign against President Karzai and US/NATO forces in Afghanistan, and to attack Pakistani state, military, and police installations. The TTP has conducted numerous armed, bomb and suicide attacks to achieve its objectives. The TTP has also engaged in criminal activity, such as extortion, theft, robbery and kidnapping for ransom to support its terrorist operations. The TTP maintains links to Al Qaida (AQ), Lashka-e-Jahngvi (LJ) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), all listed terrorist groups under Canada's Criminal Code. Recently, in February 2018, the TPP claimed responsibility for a suicide attack at an army base in northern Pakistan, killing at least 11 soldiers and wounding 13 others.

Date listed
2011-07-05

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

The Base

Also known as
N/A

Description
The Base is a neo-Nazi organization founded in 2018. The group was primarily active in the United States and promotes a nihilistic and accelerationist rhetoric— an ideology embraced by white supremacists who have determined that a societal collapse is both imminent and necessary. They advocate for direct action, especially in the form of violence, to create chaos, incite a race war, and establish a white ethno-state. The Base has distributed manuals for lone-wolf terror attacks, bomb making, counter-surveillance, and guerilla warfare to its members. Members of the group plotted to carry out attacks at a January 2020 rally in Virginia, United States. The group also organized training camps in weaponry and military tactics around North America. The network specifically seeks to recruit individuals with military experience so that they can leverage their training.

Date listed
2021-02-03

Date reviewed
Not yet reviewed

Three Percenters

Also known as
3%ers, III%ers, Threepers

Description
Three Percenters are a decentralized entity within the broader anti-government militia movement in the United States. The name “Three Percenters” is a reference to a false belief that the number of Americans who fought against the British during the Revolutionary War amounted to only three percent of the population at the time. The entity has a presence in the United States and Canada. Three Percenters have been linked to bomb plots targeting United States federal government buildings and Muslim communities. In November 2015, a Three Percenter was arrested and eventually convicted of shooting and wounding five men at a Black Lives Matter demonstration in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Most notably, in 2020, two of the group's leaders directed a plot to kidnap the Governor of Michigan that involved acquiring and detonating explosives to divert police attention from the kidnapping, as well as public executions of public officials by hanging them on live television.

Date listed
2021-06-25

Date reviewed
Not yet reviewed

World Tamil Movement (WTM)

Also known as
N/A

Description
The World Tamil Movement was created in 1986 and became a known and leading front organization for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Canada. The leadership of the WTM acts at the direction of the LTTE and has been instrumental in fundraising in Canada on behalf of the LTTE. WTM representatives canvas for donations amongst the Canadian Tamil population, and have been involved in acts of intimidation and extortion to secure funds.

Date listed
2008-06-13

Date reviewed
2018-11-21

Date modified:

Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) are foreign organizations that are designated by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended. FTO designations play a critical role in our fight against terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business.

Identification

The Bureau of Counterterrorism in the State Department (CT) continually monitors the activities of terrorist groups active around the world to identify potential targets for designation. When reviewing potential targets, CT looks not only at the actual terrorist attacks that a group has carried out, but also at whether the group has engaged in planning and preparations for possible future acts of terrorism or retains the capability and intent to carry out such acts.

Designation

Once a target is identified, CT prepares a detailed “administrative record,” which is a compilation of information, typically including both classified and open sources information, demonstrating that the statutory criteria for designation have been satisfied. If the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, decides to make the designation, Congress is notified of the Secretary’s intent to designate the organization and given seven days to review the designation, as the INA requires. Upon the expiration of the seven-day waiting period and in the absence of Congressional action to block the designation, notice of the designation is published in the Federal Register, at which point the designation takes effect. By law an organization designated as an FTO may seek judicial review of the designation in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit not later than 30 days after the designation is published in the Federal Register.

Until recently the INA provided that FTOs must be redesignated every 2 years or the designation would lapse. Under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), however, the redesignation requirement was replaced by certain review and revocation procedures. IRTPA provides that an FTO may file a petition for revocation 2 years after its designation date (or in the case of redesignated FTOs, its most recent redesignation date) or 2 years after the determination date on its most recent petition for revocation. In order to provide a basis for revocation, the petitioning FTO must provide evidence that the circumstances forming the basis for the designation are sufficiently different as to warrant revocation. If no such review has been conducted during a 5 year period with respect to a designation, then the Secretary of State is required to review the designation to determine whether revocation would be appropriate. In addition, the Secretary of State may at any time revoke a designation upon a finding that the circumstances forming the basis for the designation have changed in such a manner as to warrant revocation, or that the national security of the United States warrants a revocation. The same procedural requirements apply to revocations made by the Secretary of State as apply to designations. A designation may be revoked by an Act of Congress, or set aside by a Court order.

Legal Criteria for Designation under Section 219 of the INA as amended

1. It must be a foreign organization.
2. The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined in section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)),or terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)), or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.
3. The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States.

Legal Ramifications of Designation

1. It is unlawful for a person in the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to knowingly provide “material support or resources” to a designated FTO. (The term “material support or resources” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) as ” any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who maybe or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(2) provides that for these purposes “the term ‘training’ means instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(3) further provides that for these purposes the term ‘expert advice or assistance’ means advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge.’’
2. Representatives and members of a designated FTO, if they are aliens, are inadmissible to and, in certain circumstances, removable from the United States (see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182 (a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)-(V), 1227 (a)(1)(A)).
3. Any U.S. financial institution that becomes aware that it has possession of or control over funds in which a designated FTO or its agent has an interest must retain possession of or control over the funds and report the funds to the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.

Other Effects of Designation

1. Supports our efforts to curb terrorism financing and to encourage other nations to do the same.
2. Stigmatizes and isolates designated terrorist organizations internationally.
3. Deters donations or contributions to and economic transactions with named organizations.
4. Heightens public awareness and knowledge of terrorist organizations.
5. Signals to other governments our concern about named organizations.

Revocations of Foreign Terrorist Organizations

The Immigration and Nationality Act sets out three possible basis for revoking a Foreign Terrorist Organization designation:

1. The Secretary of State must revoke a designation if the Secretary finds that the circumstances that were the basis of the designation have changed in such a manner as to warrant a revocation;
2. The Secretary of State must revoke a designation if the Secretary finds that the national security of the United States warrants a revocation;
3. The Secretary of State may revoke a designation at any time.

Any revocation shall take effect on the date specified in the revocation or upon publication in the Federal Register if no effective date is specified. The revocation of a designation shall not affect any action or proceeding based on conduct committed prior to the effective date of such revocation.

ISIS are targeting dating websites to lure jihadi brides to join their ranks, it has been claimed.

Islamic State have been prolific at exploiting online platforms to spread propaganda and encourage extremists to fight their cause in Syria and Iraq.

But now it seems not even dating websites are safe from terrorist recruiters who are trying to encourage young women to marry ISIS militants.

A Jordanian intelligence official said no online platform is out of Islamic State's reach.

Read more:

He said: "At the end of last year, we were approached by a family living near Zarqa [Jordan’s second-largest city] who believed their daughter was speaking to dangerous people online,”

"I told them, ‘Close her Twitter and Telegram,’ but they said, ‘No, it’s the dating site she is on."

The man, presumably an ISIS fighter, had got in contact with the woman via a dating site for devout Muslims.

He tried to convince her to come to Raqqa, Islamic State's de-facto capital, on the promise of riches and a husband.

The officer continued: "He told her about the big house she would have and the servants.

"Her husband would be a handsome fighter … he even sent her photos of the beautiful jewelry he would buy her for her wedding night."

Luckily, the daughter was prevented from joining ISIS before it was too late.

The official said: "Her case just shows you that even on dating sites ISIS is recruiting."

Read more:

According to U.S. intelligence, the reason ISIS have been so successful is due to their effective use of the internet.

A US intelligence officer told BuzzFeed news : "I don’t think it is far-fetched to say that the internet is a major reason why ISIS is so successful, and so worrying, as far as global terror movements go.

"They have always been ‘good’ at the internet, at the strategy of how they use it.

"Now they are smarter at the internet too."

It is thought missing 15-year-old Yusra Hussien, who ran off to join Islamic State, was groomed on a dating website.

it is feared Yusra, from Bristol, was brainwashed into running away to get to Syria by Islamic State plotters who are trying to get wives for their men.

RESEARCH PAPER

KEYWORDS

ABSTRACT

The fight that Europe and the West must wage against jihadist terrorism will take some time, but if we live up to our values of integration and democracy, we will come out of it soon. As Giovanni Falcone, the Italian judge killed by the Mafia, once said about the Mafia: “It is a human phenomenon, and as all human phenomena has a start and an evolution, it will have also an end”.

Jihadis have been using Twitter at least since 2010, with the Shabaab joining the site in December 2011, but never before to this extent. One early adapter of Twitter, the Afghan Taliban, began to establish their social media presence in December 2010, through which they issued brief bulletins about their actions and alerts for forthcoming communiqués. Many of the most prominent jihadi groups have followed the same path, including the Shabaab al-Mujahideen, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), jihadist dating site. The content of these Twitter accounts has tended to closely mirror material released to jihadi forums. For example, the Afghan Taliban may post the best free dating sites for mature adults text of a communiqué to their website, to a jihadi forum, and to the Twitter account of one of their spokesmen. Mirroring jihadi groups, elements of the online jihadi community have also migrated to social media sites, with prominent forums such as Shumukh al-Islam and Ansar al- Mujahideen English Forum creating Twitter accounts to publicise notable releases and discussions. Concurrently, many individual jihadis and jihadi supporters have joined Twitter, enthusiastically circulating propaganda among themselves and promoting it to potential recruits. Yet, the benefits conferred by social networking come with a substantial cost: social networking platforms can sow great confusion if known official accounts are deleted and re-established or if there are multiple accounts claiming to represent a specific jihadi group. In order to reach the new official accounts, followers must be able to distinguish the legitimate social media accounts of jihadi groups from non-authenticated users, which is a level of ambiguity that is not found on jihadi forums.

REFERENCES (26)

Islamic jihadist dating site other uses, see Jihad (disambiguation).

Jihad (; Arabic: جهاد, romanized: jihād[dʒiˈhaːd]) is an Arabic word which literally means "striving" or "struggling", especially with a praiseworthy aim.^[1][2][3][4] In an Islamic context, it can refer to almost any effort to make personal and social life conform with God's guidance, such as struggle against one's evil inclinations, proselytizing, or efforts toward the moral betterment of the Muslim community (Ummah),^[1][2][5][6] though it is most frequently associated with war.^[4][7] In classical Islamic law (sharia), jihadist dating site, the term refers to armed struggle against unbelievers,^[2][3] while modernist Islamic scholars generally equate military jihad with defensive warfare.^[8][9] In Sufi circles, spiritual and moral jihad has been traditionally emphasized under the name of greater jihad.^[5][10][3] The term has gained additional attention in recent decades through its use by various insurgentIslamic extremist, militantIslamist, and terrorist individuals and organizations whose ideology is based on the Islamic notion of jihad.^{[5][7][11][12]}

The word jihad appears frequently in the Qur'an with and without military connotations,^[13] often in the idiomatic expression "striving in the path of God (al-jihad fi sabil Allah)",^[14][15] conveying a sense of self-exertion, jihadist dating site. They developed an elaborate set of rules pertaining to jihad, including prohibitions on harming those who are not engaged in combat.^[17][18] In the modern era, jihadist dating site, the notion of jihad has lost its jurisprudential relevance and instead given rise to an ideological and political discourse.^[5][8] While modernist Islamic scholars have emphasized the defensive and non-military aspects of jihad, some Islamists have advanced aggressive interpretations that go beyond the classical theory.^[8][12]

Jihad is classified into inner ("greater") jihad, which involves a struggle against one's own base impulses, and external ("lesser") jihad, which is further subdivided into jihad of the pen/tongue (debate or persuasion) and jihad of the sword.^[5][10] Most Western writers consider external jihad to have primacy over inner jihad in the Islamic tradition, while much jihadist dating site contemporary Muslim opinion favors the opposite view.Gallup analysis of a large survey reveals considerable nuance in the conceptions of jihad held by Jihadist dating site around the world.^[20]

The sense jihadist dating site jihad as armed resistance was first used in the context of persecution faced by Muslims, as when Muhammad was at Mecca, when the community had two choices: emigration (hijra) or jihad. In TwelverShi'a Islam, jihad is one of the ten Practices of the Religion.^[22] A person engaged in jihad is called a mujahid (plural: mujahideen). The term jihad is often rendered in English as "Holy War",^[23][24][25] although this translation is controversial.^[26][27] Today, the word jihad is often used without jihadist dating site connotations, like the English crusade.^[1][2]

Etymology and jihadist dating site origins

The term jihad is derived from the Arabic rootjahada, meaning "to exert strength and effort, to use all means in order to accomplish a task". In its expanded sense, it can be fighting the enemies of Islam, as well as adhering to religious teachings, enjoining good and forbidding evil.^[28] The peaceful sense of "efforts towards the moral uplift of society or towards the spread of Islam" can be known as "jihad of the tongue" or "jihad of the pen", as opposed to "jihad of the sword".^[29] It is used as a term in fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) mostly in the latter sense, while in Sufism mostly in the sense of fighting the nafs al-ammara, which is the psychological state of being consumed by your own desires.^[28] Spiritual and moral jihad is generally emphasized in pious and mystical circles.^[29]

The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic defines the term as "fight, battle; jihad, holy war (against the infidels, as a religious duty)".^[30] However, given the range of meanings, it is incorrect to equate it simply with "holy war".^[29] The notion of jihad has its origins in the Islamic idea that the whole humankind will embrace Islam.^[31] In the Qur'an and in later Muslim usage, jihad is commonly followed by the expression fi sabil illah, "in the path of God."^[32]Muhammad Abdel-Haleem states that it indicates "the way of truth and justice, including all the teachings it gives on the justifications and the conditions for the conduct of war and peace."^[33]

In Modern Standard Arabic, the term jihad is used for a struggle for causes, both religious and secular. It is sometimes used without religious connotation, with a meaning similar to the English word "crusade" (as in "a crusade against drugs").^[34]Jihad is also used quite commonly in Arabic countries, in the neutral sense of "a struggle for a noble cause", as a jihadist dating site name jihadist dating site to children.^[35] Nonetheless, jihad is usually used in the religious sense and its beginnings are traced back to the Qur'an and the words and actions of Muhammad.^[36][37]

Quran

Jihad is mentioned in four places in the Qur'an as a noun, while its derived verb is used jihadist dating site twenty-four places. Mujahid, the active participle meaning "jihadist", is mentioned in two verses.^[28] In some of these mentions (see At-Tawbah 9/41, 44, 81, 86), it is understood that the word jihad directly refers to war, and in others, jihad is used in the sense of "the effort to live in accordance with Allah's will".^[28] Quranic exhortions to jihad have been interpreted by Islamic scholars both in the combative and non-combative sense.^[38] Ahmed al-Dawoody writes that there seventeen references to or derivatices of jihad occur altogether forty-one times in eleven Meccan texts and thirty Medinan ones, with 28 mentions related to religious belief or spiritual struggle and 13 mentions related to warfare or physical struggle.^[13]

Hadith

There are also many hadiths (records of the teachings, deeds and sayings of the Islamic prophet Muhammad) about jihad, typically under the headings of kitab al-jihad (book of jihad) or faza'il al-jihad (virtues of jihad) in hadith collections or as the subject of independent works.^[28] Of the 199 hadith references to jihad in the Bukhari collection of hadith, all assume that jihad means warfare.^[39][40][41]

Among reported sayings of the Islamic prophet Muhammad involving jihad are

The best Jihad is the word of Justice in front of the oppressive sultan.

— cited by Ibn Nuhaas and narrated by Ibn Habbaan^[42][43][44]

and

The Messenger of Allah was asked about the best jihad. He said: "The best jihad is the one in which your horse is slain and your blood is spilled."

— cited by Ibn Nuhaas and narrated by Ibn Habbaan^[45]

Ibn Nuhaas also cited a hadith^{[citation needed]} from Musnad Ahmad ibn Hanbal, where Muhammad states that the highest kind of jihad is "The person who is killed whilst spilling the last of his blood" (Ahmed 4/144).^[46]

According to another hadith,^[47] supporting one's parents is also an example of jihad.^[48] It has also been reported that Muhammad considered performing hajj well to be the best jihad for Muslim women.^[49]

The hadith emphasize jihad as one of the means to Paradise. All sins (except debt) would be forgiven for the one dies in it. Participation in jihad had to be jihadist dating site and intention must be pure, for jihad is only waged for the sake of God not for material wealth. On the contrary, jihad required man to put both his life and wealth at risk. Jihad is ranked as one of the highest good deeds; according to one hadith it is the third best deed after prayer and being good to one's parents. One hadith exempts military jihad on men whose parents are alive, as serving one's parents is considered a superior jihadist dating site and Lesser jihad

Jihad has traditionally been divided into "greater jihad" (inner struggle against sinful behavior) and "lesser jihad" (military sense).^[5] Early Islamic thought considered non-violent interpretations of jihad, especially for those Muslims who could not partake jihadist dating site warfare in distant lands.^[53] Most classical writings use the term jihad in the military sense.^[54][55] The tradition differentiating between the “greater and lesser jihad” is not included in any of the authoritative compilations of Hadith. In consequence, some Islamists dismiss it as not authentic.^[56]

The most commonly cited hadith for "greater jihad" is:^[57]

A number of fighters came to Muhammad and he said "You have come from the 'lesser jihad' to the 'greater jihad'." The fighters asked "what is the greater jihad?" Muhammad replied replied, "It is the struggle against one's passions."^[58]

This was also cited in The History of Baghdad by Al-Khatib al-Baghdadi, an 11th-century Islamic scholar.^[59][60] This reference gave rise to the distinguishing of two forms of jihad: "greater" and "lesser".^[58] Some Islamic scholars, such as Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani, consider the hadith to have a weak chain of transmission.^[61]

The concept has had "enormous influence" in Islamic mysticism (Sufism).

Ibn Hazm, lists four kinds of jihad fi sabilillah (struggle in the cause of God):

• Jihad of the heart (jihad bil qalb/nafs) is concerned with combatting the devil and jihadist dating site the attempt to escape his persuasion to evil. This type of Jihad was regarded as the greater jihad (al-jihad al-akbar).
• Jihad by the tongue (jihad bil lisan) (also Jihad by the word, jihad al-qalam) is concerned with speaking the truth and spreading the word of Islam jihadist dating site one's tongue.
• Jihad by the hand (jihad bil yad) refers to choosing to do what is right and to combat injustice and what is wrong with action.
• Jihad by the sword (jihad bis saif) refers to qital fi sabilillah (armed fighting in the way of God, or holy war), the most common usage by Salafi Muslims and offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood.^[64]

A related hadith tradition that has "found its way into popular Muslim literature",^[65] and which has been said to "embody the Muslim mindset" of the Islamic Golden Age (the period from jihadist dating site mid-8th century to mid-13th century following the relocation of the Abbasid capital from Damascus to Baghdad),^[66] is:

"The ink of the scholar is more holy than the blood of the martyr."

The belief in the veracity of this hadith was a contributing factor in the efforts by successive caliphs to subsidize translations of "Greek, Hebrew and Syriac science and philosophy texts",^[67] and the saying continues to be heavily emphasised to this day in certain Islamic traditions advocating intellectualism over violence, for example in Timbuktu,^[68] where it is central to one of two key lessons in the work Tuhfat al-fudala by the 16th-century Berber scholar Ahmed Baba.^[69] In jihadist dating site, however, fewer people today are aware of the hadith, which suffers from "a general lack of knowledge", according to Akbar Ahmed.^[70]

According to classical Islamic scholars like Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Jihad is against four types of enemies: the lower self (nafs), Satan, the unbelievers, and the hypocrites. The jihadist dating site two types of Jihad are purely peaceful spiritual struggles. According to Ibn Qayyim jihadist dating site against the lower self precedes jihad against external enemies". Confirming the central importance of the spiritual aspect of Jihad, Ibn Taymiyyah writes:

"Jihad against the lower self and whims is the foundation of jihad against the unbelievers and hypocrites, for a Muslim cannot wage jihad against them unless he has waged jihad against himself and his desires first, before jihadist dating site goes out against them."^[71]

Engaging in the greater jihad did not preclude engaging in the lesser jihad. Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani recommended his followers to pursue both the greater and the lesser jihads.^[72]

At least one important contemporary Twelver Shia figure, AyatollahRuhollah Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian Revolution and the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, wrote a treatise on the "Greater Jihadist dating site (i.e., internal/personal struggle against sin).^[73]

Defensive and offensive jihad

Main article: Rules of war in Islam

Classical scholars discussed justifications for jihad, including waging it defensively vs offensively. However, classical jurists paid more jihadist dating site to conduct jihadist dating site war jus in bello (see next section) than justification of war jus ad bellum.^[74] The decision of when to wage war was often viewed viewed as a political decision best left to political authorities.

Two justifications for jihad were given: defensive war against external aggression, or an offensive or preemptive attack against an enemy state. According to the majority of jurists, the casus belli (justifications for war) are restricted to aggression against Muslims, and fitna—persecution of Muslims because of their religious belief. They hold that unbelief in itself is not a justification for war. These jurists therefore maintain that only combatants are to be fought; noncombatants such as women, children, clergy, the aged, the insane, farmers, serfs, the blind, and so on are not to be killed in war. Thus, the Hanafī Ibn Najīm states: "the reason for jihād in our [the Hanafīs] view is kawnuhum harbā ‛alaynā [literally, their being at war against us]."^[80] The Hanafī jurists al-Shaybānī state that "although kufr [unbelief in God] is one of the greatest sins, it is between the individual and his God the Almighty and the punishment for this sin is to be postponed to the dār al-jazā’, (the abode of reckoning, the Hereafter)," and al-Sarakhsī says something similar. Offensive jihad involved forays into enemy territory either for conquest, and thus enlarging the Muslim political order, jihadist dating site, or to dissuade the enemy from attacking Muslim lands.^[82]

Shia and Sunni theories of jihad are similar,^[36] except that Shias consider offensive jihad to be valid only under the leadership of the Mahdi, who is currently believed to be in occultation but will return at some point in the future.^[83][84] However, defensive jihad is permissible in Shia Islam before the Mahdi's return.^[83] In fact, Shia scholars emphasized it was a religious duty for Shia jihadist dating site defend all Muslims (including Sunni Muslims) from outside invaders.

They might be our enemies but they are human beings. They consist of civil population comprising of women and children; how can one kill, loot jihadist dating site plunder them?

— Ali ibn Abi Talib, Najh Al-Balagha

Rules of warfare

Rules prohibit attacking or molesting non-combatants, which include women, children under the age of Puberty, elderly men, people with disabilities and those who are sick, jihadist dating site. Diplomats, merchants and peasants are similarly immune from being attacked, jihadist dating site. Monks are presumed to be non-combatants and thus have immunity too; similarly places of worship should not be attacked. Even if the enemy disregarded the immunity of noncombatants, Muslims could not respond in kind.^[72] However, these categories lose their immunity if jihadist dating site participate in fighting, jihadist dating site or supplying the enemy. Some jurists argued that immunity was more related to noncombatant status than being in jihadist dating site certain demographic class. For example, Muhaqqiq al-Hilli opined that only old men jihadist dating site only immune from being killed if they neither fight, nor take a role in military decision making.

Up until the Crusades, Muslim jurists disallowed the use of mangonels because the weapon killed indiscriminately with the potential of harming noncombatants. But during Crusades this ruling was reversed out of military need. Jurists also grappled with the question of attacking an enemy that used women, children or Muslims as human shields. Most jurists held that it was permissible to attack the enemy in cases of military necessity, but steps should be taken to direct at the attack towards the combatants and avoiding the human shield. Abu Hanifa argued that if Muslims stopped combat for fear of killing noncombatants, then such a rule would make fighting impossible, as every city had civilians.^[72] Mutilating the dead bodies of the enemy is prohibited.

There are two conflicting rulings on destruction of enemy property. In one military battle, Prophet Muhammad ordered the jihadist dating site of an enemy's palm trees as a means of ending a siege without bloodshed. By contrast, Abu Bakr prohibited destruction of trees, buildings and livestock. Most jurists did not allow unnecessary destruction of enemy property,^[72] but allowed it in cases of military necessity, such as destroying buildings in which the enemy is taking shelter. Some jurists also allowed destruction if it would weaken the enemy or win the war. Many jurists cautioned against "unnecessary devastation", not just out of humanitarian concerns, but practical ones: it is more useful to capture an enemy's property than to destroy it. Islamic scholars prohibited what questions to ask a guy before dating him animals, unless due to military necessity (such as killing horses in battle). This is because, unlike other enemy property, animals are capable of feeling pain.

History of usage and practice

See also: List of expeditions of Jihadist dating site pre-Islamic Arabia, Bedouins conducted raids against enemy tribes and settlements to collect spoils. According to some scholars (such as James Turner Johnson), jihadist dating site, while Islamic leaders "instilled into the hearts of the warriors the belief" in jihad "holy war" and ghaza (raids), the "fundamental structure" of this bedouin warfare "remained. . raiding to collect booty".^[96] According to Jonathan Berkey, the Quran's statements in support of jihad may have jihadist dating site been directed against Muhammad's local enemies, the pagans of Mecca or the Jews of Medina, but these same statements could be redirected once new enemies appeared.^[97] According to another scholar jihadist dating site Khadduri), it was the shift in focus to the conquest and spoils collecting of non-Bedouin unbelievers and away from traditional inter-bedouin tribal raids, that may have made it possible for Islam not only to expand but to avoid self-destruction.^[98]

Classical

The primary aim of jihad as warfare is not the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam by force, but rather the expansion and defense of the Islamic state.^[99][100] In theory, jihad was to continue until "all mankind either embraced Islam or submitted to the authority of the Muslim state." There could be truces before this was achieved, but no permanent peace.^[101] One who jihadist dating site "on the path of God" was a martyr (shahid), whose sins were remitted and who was secured "immediate entry to paradise".^[84]

According with Bernard Lewis, "from an early date Muslim law laid down" jihad in the military sense as "one of the principal obligations" of both "the head of the Muslim state", who declared the jihad, and the Muslim community.^[101] According to legal historian Sadakat Kadri, Islamic jurists first developed classical doctrine of jihad "towards the end of the eighth century", using the doctrine of naskh (that God gradually improved His revelations over the course of Muhammed's mission) they subordinated verses in the Quran emphasizing harmony to more the more "confrontational" verses of Muhammad's later years and linked verses on exertion (jihad) to those of fighting (qital). Muslims jurists of the eighth century developed a paradigm of international relations that divides the world into three conceptual divisions, dar al-Islam/dar al-‛adl/dar al-salam jihadist dating site of Islam/house of justice/house of peace), dar al-harb/dar al-jawr (house of war/house of injustice, oppression), and dar al-sulh/dar al-‛ahd/dār al-muwada‛ah (house of peace/house of covenant/house of reconciliation).^[103][104] The second/eighth century jurist Sufyan al-Thawri (d. 161/778) headed what Khadduri calls a pacifist school, which maintained that jihad was only a defensive war.^[105][106] He also states that the jurists who held this position, among whom he refers to Hanafi jurists al-Awza‛i (d. 157/774) and Malik ibn Anas (d. 179/795), and other early jurists, "stressed that tolerance should jihadist dating site shown unbelievers, especially scripturaries and advised the Imam to prosecute war only when the inhabitants of the dar al-harb came into conflict with Islam."^[106][107] The duty of Jihad was a collective one (fard al-kifaya). It was to be directed only by the caliph who might delayed it when convenient, negotiating truces for up to ten years at a time. Within classical Islamic jurisprudence—the development of which is to be dated into—the first few centuries after the prophet's death^[109]—jihad consisted of wars against unbelievers, apostates, and was the only form of warfare permissible.^[110] (Another source—Bernard Lewis—states that fighting rebels and bandits was legitimate though not a form of jihad,^[111] and that while the classical perception and presentation of the jihad was warfare in the field against a foreign enemy, internal jihad "against an infidel renegade, or otherwise illegitimate regime was not unknown."^[112])

However, jihadist dating site argue martyrdom is never automatic because it is within God's exclusive province to judge who is worthy of that designation.^[113]

Classical manuals of Islamic jurisprudence often contained a section called Book of Jihad, with rules governing the conduct of war covered at great length. Such rules include treatment of nonbelligerents, women, children (also cultivated or residential areas),^[114] and division of spoils. Such rules offered protection for civilians.^[117] Spoils include Ghanimah (spoils obtained by actual fighting), and fai (obtained without fighting i.e. when the enemy surrenders or flees).^[118]

The first documentation of the law of jihad was written by 'Abd al-Rahman al-Awza'i and Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani. (It grew out of debates that surfaced following Muhammad's death.^[36]) Although some Islamic scholars have differed on the implementation of Jihad, there is consensus amongst them that the concept of jihad will always include armed struggle against persecution and oppression.^[119]

Both Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim asserted that Muhammad never initiated any hostilities and that all the wars he engaged in were primarily defensive. He never forced non-Muslims to Islam and upheld the truces with non-Muslims so jihadist dating site as they didn't violate them. Ibn Taymiyya's views on Jihad are explained in his treatise titled Qāʿidah mukhtaṣarah fī qitāl al-kuffār wa muhādanatuhum wa taḥrīm qatlahum li mujarrad kufrihim. (An abridged rule on fighting the unbelievers and making truces with them, and the prohibition of killing them merely because of their unbelief) According to Ibn Taymiyya, jihadist dating site, every human blood is inviolable by default, except "by right of justice". Although Ibn Taymiyya authorised offensive Jihad ( Jihad al-Talab) against enemies who threaten Muslims or obstruct their citizens from freely accepting Islam, unbelief (Kufr) by itself is not a justification for violence, whether against individuals or states. According to Ibn Taymīyah, jihad is a legitimate reaction to military aggression by jihadist dating site and not merely due to religious differences. Ibn Taymiyya writes:

"As for the transgressor who does not fight, there are no texts in which Allah commands him to be fought. Rather, the unbelievers are only fought on the condition that they wage war, as is practiced jihadist dating site the majority of scholars and is evident in the Book and Sunnah."^[71][120]

As important as jihad was, it has not been considered one of the "pillars of Islam". According to one scholar (Majid Khadduri, this is because the five pillars jihadist dating site individual obligations, but jihad is a "collective obligation" of the whole Muslim community meant to be carried out by the Islamic state.^[121] This was jihadist dating site belief of "all jurists, with almost no exception", but did not apply to defense of the Muslim community from a sudden attack, in which case jihad was and "individual obligation" of all believers, including women and children.^[121]

Scholars had previously assumed it was the responsibility of a centralized government to organize jihad. But this changed as the authority of the Abbasid caliph weakened.^[122]Al-Mawardi allowed local governors to wage jihad on the caliph's behalf. This decentralization of jihad became especially pressing after the Crusades. Ali ibn Jihadist dating site al-Sulami argued that all Muslims were responsible for waging wars of self-defense.^[122] Al-Sulami encouraged Muslim rulers from distant lands to assist those Muslims being invaded.^[122]

Classical Shia doctrine maintained defensive jihad was always permissible, but offensive jihad required the presence of the Imam. An exception to this, during medieval times, jihadist dating site, was when the first Fatimid caliph Abdallah al-Mahdi Billah claimed to be the representative of the Imam and claimed the right to launch offensive jihad.

After the Mongol invasions, Shia scholar Muhaqqiq al-Hilli made defensive war not just which dating app has the most users but praiseworthy, even obligatory. If a Muslim could not take part in the defense then he should, at least, send material support. This remained the case even if the Muslims were ruled by an unjust ruler.

Early Jihadist dating site conquests

Main article: Early Muslim conquests

In the early era that sex before relationship dating classical Islam (Rashidun Caliphate) and lasted less than a century, jihad spread the realm of Islam to include millions of subjects, and an area extending "from the borders of India and China to the Pyrenees and the Atlantic".^[125] The role of religion in these early conquests is debated, jihadist dating site. Medieval Arabic authors believed the conquests were commanded by God, and presented them as orderly and disciplined, jihadist dating site, under the command of the caliph. Many modern historians question whether hunger and desertification, rather than jihad, was a motivating force in the conquests. The famous historian William Montgomery Watt argued that "Most of the participants in the [early Islamic] expeditions probably thought of nothing more than booty . There was no thought of spreading the religion of Islam." Similarly, Edward J. Jurji argues that the motivations of the Arab conquests were certainly not "for the propagation of Islam . Military advantage, economic desires, [and] the attempt to strengthen the hand of the state and enhance its sovereignty ., jihadist dating site. are some of the determining factors."^[48] Some recent explanations cite both material and religious causes in the conquests.

Post-Classical usage

According to some authors,^[who?] the more spiritual definitions of jihad developed sometime after the 150 years of jihad wars and Muslim territorial expansion, and particularly after the Mongol invaders sacked Baghdad and overthrew the Abbasid Caliphate.^{[citation needed][129]} The historian Hamilton Gibb states that "in the historic [Muslim] Community the concept of jihad had gradually weakened and at length it had been largely reinterpreted in terms of Sufi ethics."^[130] Johnson notes that "despite the theoretical importance of the idea of jihad in classical Islamic juristic thought", by the time of the Abbasids, the concept was no longer central to statecraft.^[96]

Rudolph Peters also wrote that with the stagnation of Islamic expansionism, the concept of jihad became internalized as a moral or spiritual struggle.^[131] Earlier classical works jihadist dating site fiqh emphasized jihad as war for God's religion, Peters found. Later Islamic scholars like Ibn al-Amir al-San'ani, Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Rida, Ubaidullah Sindhi, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Shibli Nomani, etc emphasized the defensive aspect of Jihad, distinguishing between defensive Jihad ( jihad al-daf) and offensive Jihad ( Jihad al-talab or Jihad of choice ). They refuted the notion of consensus on Jihad al-talab being a communal obligation( fard kifaya ). In support of this view, these scholars referred to the works of classical jihadist dating site such as Al-Jassas, Ibn Jihadist dating site, etc. According to Ibn Taymiyya, the reason for Jihad against non-Muslims is not their disbelief, but the threat they pose to Muslims. Citing Ibn Taymiyya, scholars like Rashid Rida, Al San'ani, Qaradawi,etc argues that unbelievers need not be fought unless they pose a threat to Muslims. Thus, Jihad is obligatory only as a defensive warfare to respond to aggression or "perfidy" against the Muslim community, and that the "normal and desired state" between Islamic and non-Islamic territories was one of "peaceful coexistence." This was similar to the Western concept of a "Just war".^[132][133] Similarly the 18th-century Islamic scholar Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab defined Jihad as a defensive military action to protect the Muslim community, and emphasized its defensive aspect in synchrony with later 20th jihadist dating site Islamic writers.^[134] Today, some Muslim authors only recognize wars fought for the purpose of territorial defense as well as wars fought for the defense of religious freedom as legitimate.^[135]

Ibn Taymiyyah's hallmark themes included the permissibility of overthrowing a ruler who is classified as an unbeliever due to a failure to adhere to Islamic law, the absolute division of the world into dar jihadist dating site and dar al-Islam, the labeling of anyone not adhering to one's particular interpretation of Islam as an jihadist dating site, and the call for blanket warfare against Non-Muslims, particularly Jews jihadist dating site Christians.^[136]

Ibn Taymiyyah recognized "the possibility of a jihad against `heretical` and `deviant` Muslims within dar al-Islam. He identified as heretical and deviant Muslims anyone who propagated innovations (bida') contrary to the Quran and Free plus size dating apps . legitimated jihad against anyone datings apps for christians refused to abide by Islamic law or revolted against the true Muslim authorities." He used a very "broad definition" of what constituted aggression or rebellion against Muslims, which would make jihad "not only permissible but necessary."^[137] Ibn Taymiyyah also paid careful and lengthy jihadist dating site to the questions of martyrdom and the benefits of jihad: 'It is in jihad that one can live and die in ultimate happiness, both in this world and in the Hereafter. Abandoning it means losing entirely or partially both kinds of happiness.`^[138]

Bernard Lewis states that while most Islamic theologians in the classical period (750–1258 CE) understood jihad to be a military endeavor,^[139] after Islamic conquest stagnated and the caliphate broke up into smaller states the "irresistible and permanent jihad came to an end". As jihad became unfeasible it was "postponed from historic to messianic time."^[140] Even when the Ottoman Empire carried on a new holy war of expansion in the seventeenth century, "the war was not universally pursued". They made no attempt to recover Spain or Sicily.^{[141][better source needed]}

By the 1500s, it had become accepted that the permanent state of relations between dar al-Islam and dar al-harb was that of peace.

Shah Ismail of the Safavid dynasty tried to claim the right to wage offensive jihad, particularly against the Ottomans, jihadist dating site. However, Shia ulama did not permit that, maintaining jihadist dating site classical position that the true Imam could wage such a war. During the Qajar period, Shia ulama adopted the position that the Shah was responsible for national security. They authorized the Perso-Russian wars in the 19th century as jihad.

In the 18th century, the Durrani Empire under the reigns of Ahmad Shah Durrani and his son and successor, Timur Shah Durrani had issued multiple jihads against Sikh Misls in the Punjab region, often to consolidate territory and continue Afghan rule in the region, efforts under Ahmad Jihadist dating site failed, jihadist dating site, while Timur Shah had succeeded.^[144]

Colonialism and modernism

When Europeans began the colonization of the Muslim world, jihadist dating site, jihad was one of the first responses by local Muslims.Emir Abdelkader organized a jihad in Algeria against French domination, tapping into existing Sufi networks. Other wars against colonialist powers were often declared to be jihad: the Senussi religious order declared jihad against Italian control of Libya in 1912, and the "Mahdi" in the Sudan jihadist dating site jihad against both the British and the Egyptians in 1881.^[84]

Rashid Rida and Muhammad Abduh argued that peaceful coexistence should be the normal state between Muslim and non-Muslim states, citing verses in the Qur'an that allowed war only in self-defense.^[2] However, this view still left open jihad against colonialism, jihadist dating site, which was seen as an attack on Muslims.^[2]

Sayyid Ahmad Khan also argued jihad was limited to cases of oppression, and since the British Raj allowed freedom of religion, there was no need to wage jihad against the British. Instead, Khan formulated jihad as recovering past Muslim scientific progress to jihadist dating site the Muslim world.

A concept that played a role in anti-colonial jihad (or lack thereof) was the belief democrats only dating sites Mahdi. According to Islamic eschatology, a messianic figure named Mahdi will appear and restore justice on earth. Such a belief sometimes discouraged Muslims from conducting jihad against the colonial powers, instead inducing them rpg dating app passively wait for the messiah to come. Such messages were circulated in Algeria to undermine Emir Abdelkader's jihad against the French. On the other hand, this belief could be a powerful mobilizing force in cases when someone would proclaim himself Mahdi. Such mahdist rebellions happened in India (1810), Egypt is yellow a dating app and Sudan jihadist dating site the Islamic revival, black conscious dating site new "fundamentalist" movement arose, with some different interpretations of Islam, which often placed an increased emphasis on jihad. The Wahhabi movement which spread across the Arabian peninsula starting in the 18th century, emphasized jihad as armed struggle.^[149] The so-called Fulbe jihad states and a few other jihad states in West Africa were established by a series of offensive wars in the 19th century.^{[citation needed]} None of these jihad movements were victorious.^[150] The most powerful, the Sokoto Caliphate, lasted about a century until being incorporated into Colonial Nigeria in 1903.^{[citation needed]}

When the Ottoman caliph called for a "Great Jihad" by all Muslims against Allied powers during World War I, there were hopes and fears that non-Turkish Muslims would side with Ottoman Turkey, jihadist dating site, but the appeal did not "[unite] the Muslim world",^[140][151] and Muslims did not turn on their non-Muslim commanders in the Allied forces.^[152] (The war led to the end of the caliphate as the Ottoman Empire entered on the side of the war's losers and surrendered by agreeing to "viciously punitive" conditions. These were overturned by the popular war hero Mustafa Kemal, who was also a secularist and later abolished the caliphate.)

Prior to the Iranian revolution in 1922, the Shiite cleric Mehdi Al-Khalissi issued a fatwa calling upon Iraqis not to participate in the Iraqi elections, jihadist dating site, as the Iraqi government was established by foreign powers. He later played a role in jihadist dating site Iraqi revolt of 1920.^[154] Between 1918 and 1919 in the Shia holy city of Najaf the League of the Islamic Awakening was established by several religious scholars, tribal chiefs, and landlords assassinated a British officer in the hopes of sparking a similar rebellion in Karbala which is also regarded as sacred for Shias.^{[citation needed]}

During the Iraqi revolt of 1920, Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Shirazi the father of Mohammad al-Husayni al-Shirazi and grandfather of Sadiq Hussaini Shirazi, declared British rule impermissible and called for a jihad against European occupations in the Middle East.^[155]

Post-colonialism

Main articles: Islamism and Criticism of Islamism

Islamism has played an increasingly role in the Muslim world in the 20th century, especially following the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s.^[156] One of the first Islamist groups, the Muslim Brotherhood, emphasized physical struggle and martyrdom in its creed: "God is our objective; the Quran is our constitution; the Jihadist dating site is our leader; struggle (jihad) is our way; and death for the sake of God is the highest of our aspirations."^[157][158]Hassan al-Banna emphasized jihad of the sword, and called on Egyptians to prepare for jihad against the British Empire,^[159] (making him the first influential scholar since the 1857 India uprising to call for jihad of the sword). The group called for jihad against Israel in the 1940s,^[161] and its Palestinian branch, Hamas, called jihadist dating site jihad against Israel when the First Intifada started.^{[162][163][164]}

Modern Muslim thought had been jihadist dating site on when to go to war (jus ad bellum), not paying much attention on conduct during war (jus in bello). This was because most Muslim theorists viewed international humanitarian law as consistent with Islamic requirements.^[165] However, recently Muslims have once again started discussing conduct during war in response to certain terrorist groups targeting civilians.^[165]

According to Rudolph F. Peters and Natana J. DeLong-Bas, the new "fundamentalist" movement brought a jihadist dating site of Islam and their own writings on jihad. These writings tended to be less interested and involved with legal arguments, what the different of schools of Dating apps for actual relationships law had to say, or in solutions for all potential situations. "They emphasize more the moral justifications and the underlying ethical values of the rules, jihadist dating site, than the detailed elaboration of those rules." They also tended to ignore the distinction between Greater and Lesser jihad because it distracted Muslims "from the development of the combative spirit they believe is required to rid the Islamic world of Western influences".^[166][167]

Contemporary Islamic fundamentalists were often influenced by medieval Islamic jurist Ibn Taymiyyah's, and Egyptian journalist Sayyid Qutb's, ideas on jihad.

jihadist dating site width="160" height="223">

Sayyid Jihadist dating site, Islamist author and influential leader of the Muslim Brotherhood

The highly influential Muslim Brotherhood leader, Sayyid Qutb, preached in his book Milestones that jihadist dating site, `is not a temporary phase but a permanent war . Jihad for freedom cannot cease until the Satanic forces are put to an end and the religion is purified for God in toto.`^[168][169] Qutb focused on martyrdom and jihad, but he added the theme of the treachery and enmity towards Islam of Christians and especially Jews. If non-Muslims were waging a "war against Islam", jihad against them was not offensive but defensive. He also insisted that Christians and Jews were mushrikeen (not monotheists) because (he alleged) gave their priests or rabbis "authority to make laws, obeying laws which were made by them [and] not permitted by God" and "obedience to laws and judgments is a sort of worship".^[170][171]

Later ideologue, Muhammad abd-al-Salam Faraj, departed from some of Qutb's teachings on jihad. While Qutb felt that jihad was a proclamation of "liberation for humanity" (in which humanity has the free choice between Islam and unbelief), Faraj saw jihad as a mean of conquering the world and reestablishing the caliphate.^[172] Faraj legitimized lying, attacking by night (even if it leads to accidentally killing innocents), and destroying trees of the infidel.^[173][174] His ideas influenced Egyptian Islamist extremist groups,^[175] and Jihadist dating site al-Zawahiri, later the No. 2 person in al-Qaeda.^[176]

Many Muslims (including scholars like al-Qaradawi and Sayyid Tantawi) denounced Islamic terrorist attacks against civilians, seeing them as contrary to rules of jihadist dating site that prohibit targeting noncombatants.^[122]

During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, despite being a predominantly Sunni nation, Afghanistan's Shiite population took arms against the Communist government and allied Soviet forces like the nation's Sunnis and were collectively referred to as the Afghan Mujahideen. Shiite Jihadists in Afghanistan were known as the Tehran Eight and received support from the Iranian government in fighting against the Communist Afghan government and allied Soviet forces in Afghanistan.^[177][178]

Abdullah Azzam

Main article: Abdullah Azzam

In the 1980s Abdullah Azzam advocated waging jihad against the "unbelievers".^[179] Azzam issued a fatwa calling for jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, declaring it an individual obligation for all able bodied Muslims because it was a defensive jihad to repel invaders. His fatwa was endorsed by a number of clerics including leading Saudi clerics such as Sheikh Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz.^[180]

Azzam claimed that "anyone who looks into the state of Muslims today will find that their great misfortune is their abandonment of Jihad", and he also warned that "without Jihad, shirk (joining partners with Allah) will spread and become dominant".^[181] Jihad was so important that to "repel" the unbelievers was "the most important obligation after Iman [faith]".^[181]

Azzam also argued for a broader interpretation of who it was permissible to kill in jihad, an interpretation that some think may have influenced some of his students, including Osama bin Laden.^[182]

A charismatic speaker, Azzam traveled to dozens of cities in Europe jihadist dating site North American to encourage support for jihad in Afghanistan. He inspired young Muslims with stories of miraculous deeds during jihad—mujahideen who defeated vast columns of Soviet troops virtually single-handed, who had been run over by tanks but survived, who were shot okcupid dating sites unscathed by bullets. Angels were witnessed riding into battle on horseback, and falling bombs were intercepted by birds, which raced ahead of the jets to form a protective canopy over the warriors.^[183] In Afghanistan he set up a "services office" for foreign fighters and with support from his former student Osama bin Laden and Saudi charities, foreign mujahideed or would-be mujahideen were provided for. Between 1982 and 1992 an estimated 35,000 individual Muslim volunteers went to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets and their Afghan regime. Thousands more attended frontier schools teeming with former and future fighters.^[184] Saudi Arabia and the other conservative Gulf monarchies also provided considerable financial support to the jihad—$600 million a year by 1982.^[185] CIA also funded Azzam's Maktab al-Khidamat^[186] and others via Operation Cyclone.

Azzam saw Afghanistan as the beginning of jihad to repel unbelievers from many countries—the southern Soviet Republics of Central Asia, Bosnia, the Philippines, Jihadist dating site, Somalia, Eritrea, Spain, and especially his home country of Palestine.^[187] The defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan is said to have "amplified the jihadist tendency from a fringe phenomenon to a major force in the Muslim world."^[184]

Having tasted victory in Afghanistan, many of the thousands of fighters returned to their home country such as Egypt, Algeria, Kashmir or to places like Bosnia to continue jihad. Not all the former fighters agreed with Azzam's chioice of targets (Azzam was assassinated in November 1989) but former Afghan fighters led or participated in serious insurgencies in Egypt, Algeria, Kashmir, Somalia in the 1990s and later creating a "transnational jihadist stream."^[188]

In February 1998, Osama bin Laden put a "Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders" in the Al-Quds al-Arabi newspaper.^[189] On 11 September 2001, four passenger planes were hijacked in the United States and crashed, destroying the World Trade Center and damaging the Pentagon, jihadist dating site.

Shia

In Shia Islam, Jihad is one of the ten Jihadist dating site of the Religion,^[22] (though not one of the five pillars). Traditionally, Twelver Shi'a doctrine has differed from that of Sunni Islam on the concept of jihad, with jihad being "seen as a lesser priority" in Shia theology and "armed activism" by Shias being "limited to a person's immediate geography".^[190]

Because of their history of being oppressed, Shias also associated jihad with certain passionate features, jihadist dating site, notably in the remembrance of Ashura. Mahmoud M. Ayoub says:

In Islamic tradition jihad or the struggle in the way of God, whether as armed struggle, or any form of opposition of the wrong, is generally regarded as one of the essential requirements of a person's faith as a Muslim. Shi'î tradition carried this requirement a step further, jihadist dating site, making jihad one of the pillars or foundations (arkan) of religion. If, therefore, Husayn's struggle against the Umayyad regime must be regarded as an act of jihad, then, In the mind of devotees, the participation of the community in his suffering and its ascent to the truth of his message must also free single hot dating site regarded as an extension of the holy struggle of the Imam himself. The hadith jihadist dating site which we took the title of this chapter jihadist dating site this point very clearly. Ja'far al-Sadiq is said to have declared to al-Mufaddal, one of his closest disciples, 'The sigh of the sorrowful for the wrong done us is jihadist dating site act of praise (tasbih) [of God], his sorrow for us is an act of worship, and his keeping of our secret is a struggle (jihad) in the way of God'; the Imâm then added, 'This hadith should be inscribed in letters of gold'.^[191]

and

Hence, the concept of jihad (holy struggle) gained a deeper and more personal meaning. Whether through weeping, the composition and recitation of poetry, showing compassion and doing good to the poor or carrying arms, the Shi'i Muslim saw himself helping the Imam in his struggle against the wrong (zulm) and gaining for himself the same merit (thawab) of those who actually fought and died for him. The ta'ziyah, in its broader sense the sharing of the entire life of the suffering family of Muhammad, has become for the Shi'i community the true meaning of compassion.^[192]

In the Syrian civil war, Shia and Sunni fighters waged jihad against each other.^[193] In Yemen, the Houthi Movement has used appeals to jihad as part of their ideology as well as their recruitment.^[194]

Evolution of the term in Islamic jurisprudence

Some observers have noted the evolution in the rules of jihad—from the original "classical" doctrine to that of 21st century Salafi jihadism. According to the legal historian Sadarat Kadri, during the last couple of centuries, incremental changes in Islamic legal doctrine (developed by Islamists who otherwise condemn any bid‘ah (innovation) in religion), have "normalized" what was once "unthinkable". "The very idea that Muslims might blow themselves up for God was unheard of before 1983, and it was not until the early 1990s that anyone anywhere had tried to justify killing innocent Muslims who were not on a battlefield."

The first or the "classical" doctrine of jihad which was jihadist dating site towards the end of the 8th century, emphasized the jihad of the sword (jihad bil-saif) rather than the "jihad of the heart",^[197] but it contained many legal restrictions which were developed from interpretations of both the Quran and the Hadith, jihadist dating site, such as detailed rules involving "the initiation, the conduct, the termination" of jihad, the treatment of prisoners, the distribution of booty, etc, jihadist dating site. Unless there was a sudden attack on the Muslim community, jihad was not a "personal obligation" (fard ayn); instead it was a "collective one" (fard al-kifaya),^[121] which had to be discharged "in the way of God" (fi sabil Allah), and it could only be directed by the caliph, "whose discretion over its conduct was all but absolute." (This was designed in jihadist dating site to avoid incidents like the Kharijia's jihad against and killing of Caliph Ali, since they deemed that he was no longer a Muslim). Martyrdom resulting from an attack on the enemy with no concern for your own safety was praiseworthy, but dying by your own hand (as opposed to the enemy's) merited a special place in Hell.^[199] Words with friends dating site category of jihad which is considered to be a collective obligation is sometimes simplified as "offensive jihad" in Western texts.^[200]

Islamic theologian Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir has been identified as the key theorist and ideologue behind modern jihadist violence.^[201] His theological and legal justifications influenced Abu Musab al-Zarqawi of al-Qaeda as well as several jihadi terrorist groups, including ISIS.^[201] Zarqawi used a manuscript of al-Muhajir's ideas at AQI training camps that were later deployed by ISIS, jihadist dating site, referred to as The Jurisprudence of Jihad or The Jurisprudence of Blood.^{[201][202][203]}

The book has been described as rationalising "the murder of non-combatants" by The Guardian's Mark Towsend, citing Salah al-Ansari of Quilliam, who notes: "There is a startling lack of study and concern regarding this abhorrent and dangerous text [The Jurisprudence of Blood] in almost all What dating sites are really free? and Arab scholarship".^[202] Charlie Winter of The Atlantic describes it as a "theological playbook used to justify the group's abhorrent acts".^[201] He states:

Ranging from ruminations on the merits of beheading, torturing, or burning prisoners to thoughts on assassination, siege warfare, and the use of biological weapons, Muhajir's intellectual legacy is a crucial component of the literary corpus of ISIS—and, indeed, whatever comes after it—a way to render practically anything permissible, provided, that is, it jihadist dating site be spun as beneficial to the jihad. [.] According to Muhajir, jihadist dating site, committing suicide to kill people is not only a theologically sound act, but a commendable one, too, something to be cherished and celebrated regardless of its outcome. [.] neither Zarqawi nor his inheritors have looked back, liberally using Muhajir's work to jihadist dating site the use of suicide tactics in the time since, such that they have become the single most important military and terrorist method—defensive or offensive—used by ISIS today. The way that Muhajir theorized it was simple—he offered up a theological fix that allows any who desire it to sidestep the Koranic injunctions against suicide.^[201]

Psychologist Chris E. Stout also discusses the al Muhajir-inspired text in his book, Terrorism, Political Violence, and Extremism. He assesses that jihadists regard their actions as being "for the greater good"; that they are in a "weakened in the earth" situation that renders terrorism a valid means of solution.^[203]

Current usage

The term 'jihad' has accrued both violent and non-violent meanings. According to John Esposito, it can simply mean striving to live a moral and virtuous life, spreading and defending Islam as well as fighting injustice and oppression, among other things.^[204] The relative importance of these two forms of jihad is a matter of controversy. Rudoph Peters writes that, in the contemporary world, traditionalist Muslims understand jihad from classical works on fiqh; modernist Muslims regard jihad as a just war in international law and emphasize its defensive aspects; and fundamentalists view it as an expansion of Islam and realization of Islamic ideals.^[133] David Cook writes that Muslims have understood jihad in a military sense, both in classical texts and in contemporary ones. For Cook the idea that jihad is primarily non-violent comes primarily from Sufi texts and the Western scholars who study them, or from Muslim apologists.^[205]Gallup has stated that its surveys show that the concept of jihad among Muslims "is considerably more nuanced than the single sense in which Western commentators invariably invoke the term."^[20]

Muslim public opinion

A poll by Gallup asked Muslims in eight countries what jihad meant to them. In Lebanon, Kuwait, jihadist dating site, Jordan, and Morocco, the most frequent response was to "duty toward God", a "divine duty", or a "worship of God", with no militaristic connotations. In Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Indonesia, many of the responses includes "sacrificing one's life for the sake of Islam/God/a just cause" or "fighting against the opponents of Islam".^[20] Other common meanings of "jihad" in the Muslim world include "a commitment to hard work", "promoting peace", and "living the principles of Islam".^[20][206] The terminology is also applied to the fight for women's liberation.^[207]

Other spiritual, social, economic struggles

Shia Muslim scholar Mahmoud M. Ayoud states that "The goal of true jihad is to attain a harmony between Islam (submission), iman (faith), and ihsan (righteous living)." Jihad is a process encompassing both individual and social reform, this is called jihad fi sabil allah ("struggle in the way of God"), jihadist dating site 420 dating sites free be undertaken by the means of the Quran (jihad bi-al-qur'an).^[208] According to Ayoud the greatest Jihad is the struggle of every Muslim against the social, moral, and political evils. However, depending on social and political circumstances, Jihad may be regarded as jihadist dating site sixth fundamental obligation (farid) incumbent on the entire Muslim community (ummah) when their integrity is in danger, in this case jihad becomes an "absolute obligation" (fard 'ayn), or when social and religious reform is gravely hampered. Otherwise it is a "limited obligation" (fard kifayah), incumbent upon those who are directly involved. These rules apply to armed struggle or "jihad jihadist dating site the sword".^[208]

In modern times, Pakistani scholar and professor Fazlur Rahman Malik has used the term to describe the struggle to establish a "just moral-social order",^[209] while President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia has used it to describe the struggle for economic development in that country.^[210]

According to the BBC, a third meaning of jihad is the struggle to build a good society.^[211] In a commentary of the hadith Sahih Muslim, jihadist dating site, entitled al-Minhaj, the medieval Islamic scholar Yahya ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi stated that "one of the collective duties of the community as a whole (fard kifaya) is to lodge a valid protest, to solve problems of religion, to have knowledge of Divine Law, to command what is right and forbid wrong conduct".^[212]

Scholar Natana J. Delong-Bas lists a number of types of "jihad" that have been proposed by Muslims

• educational jihad (jihad al-tarbiyyah);
• missionary jihad or calling the people to Islam (jihad al-da'wah)^[213]

Other "types" mentioned include

Usage by some non-Muslims

• The United States Department of Justice has used its own ad hoc definitions of jihad in indictments of individuals involved in terrorist activities:
  • "As used in this First Superseding Indictment, 'Jihad' is the Arabic word meaning 'holy war'. In this context, jihad refers to the use of violence, including paramilitary action against persons, governments deemed to be enemies of the fundamentalist version of Islam."^[219]
  • "As used in this Superseding Indictment, local dating site in canada jihad' or 'jihad' include planning, preparing for, and engaging in, acts of physical violence, including murder, maiming, kidnapping, and hostage-taking."^[220] in the indictment against several individuals including José Padilla.
• "Fighting and warfare might sometimes be necessary, but it was only a minor part of the church dating site jihad or struggle," according to Karen Armstrong.^[221]
• "Jihad is a propagandistic device which, as need be, resorts to armed struggle—two ingredients common to many ideological movements," according to Maxime Rodinson.^[222]
• Academic Benjamin R. Barber used the term Jihad to point out the resistant movement by fundamentalist ethnic groups who want to protect their traditions, heritage and identity from globalization (which he refers to as 'McWorld').^[223]

Views of other groups

Ahmadiyya

Main article: Ahmadiyya view on Jihad

In Ahmadiyya Islam, jihad is primarily one's personal inner struggle and should not be used violently for political motives. Violence is the last option only to be used to protect religion and one's own life in extreme situations of persecution.^[224]

Quranist

Quranists do not believe that the word jihad means holy war. They believe it means to struggle, free language dating site to strive. They believe it can incorporate both military and non-military aspects. When it refers to the military aspect, it is understood primarily as defensive warfare.^[225][226]

See also

References

Citations